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TOWARD A STRONGER FINANCIAL
HISTORY ANTIDISCRIMINATION NORM
LEA SHEPARD*

Abstract: This Article examines a topic at the intersection of consumer
protection and antidiscrimination law: the use by employers and licensing
organizations of applicants' credit reports and financial histories in the
hiring and licensing processes. The Article begins with a broad normative
assessment of the merits of the practice by examining applicable "logics of
personhood," categories of a framework of antidiscrimination analysis
that assesses whether traditionally unprotected groups are entitled to
formal antidiscrimination safeguards. Thus, the Article considers whether

financial histories validly and reliably reflect personality traits relevant to
job performance. It then examines to what extent the use of financial history in the employment and licensing settings is a necessary and helpful
deterrent to debt default-long regarded as a socially undesirable practice. Next, the Article evaluates the practice's impact on traditionally disadvantaged groups by assessing its relationship to racial equality and social mobility. Finally, in a novel application of behavioral economics to the
area of credit reports and financial history, this Article suggests that, in
spite of the difficult conceptual distinctions between consumer debtors

and traditional Title VII categories like race, sex, and national origin, the
findings of behavioral economists suggest that an adverse financial status
is more immutable than neoclassical economists have been willing to
concede. These observations lend critical normative support to legislative

efforts to establish a stronger financial history antidiscrimination norm.
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[History is] the most difficult of all the sciences.
-Numa

Denis Fustel de Coulanges

INTRODUCTION

An individual's financial past-the amount of debt that she has
accumulated, the payments that she has failed to make, the judgments
that creditors have recovered against her, and any bankruptcy protection that she has sought-has a formidable impact on her life. Credit
scores and credit history impact whether and at what cost she can bor-

row money to purchase a home and a car.1 They influence the prices
businesses charge for products like credit cards and auto insurance. 2 A
growing number of employers consider financial history in scrutinizing
job applicants. 3 Bar examiners and other licensing organizations consider applicants' repayment histories in assessing their fitness to join
particular professions. 4 Landlords look at financial histories in evaluating prospective renters.5 An increasing number of utilities and cell
phone carriers use credit reports and scores to price deposits for their
services. 6 Additionally, debt burdens and bankruptcy filings can affect
an employee's ability to secure or retain her security clearance. 7 For
I MA-rr

FELLOWES, BROOKINGS INST., CREDIT SCORES, REPORTS, AND GETTING AHEAD

IN AMERICA 2 (2006), http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/research/files/reports/2006/
5/childrenfamilies%20fellowes/20060501_creditscores.pdf.
2 Id.
3Id.
4 See, e.g., Hoke v. Retail Credit Corp., 521 F.2d 1079, 1084 (4th Cir. 1975) (discussing
the use of credit history by medical boards); Niles Jackson, Bankruptcy as It Affects Character
and Fitness, 72 B. EXAMINER, no. 4, 2003 at 6, 12 (discussing bar examiners' consideration
of law school graduates' bankruptcy filings when evaluating applications for admission to
the bar).
5 FELLOWES, supra note 1, at 2.
6 Id.; Baynes v. Alltel Wireless of Ala., Inc., 322 F. Supp. 2d 1307, 1313-14 (M.D. Ala.
2004) (discussing a scenario in which a consumer was required to pay a higher security
deposit to a wireless telecommunications provider because of adverse information in her
credit report).
7 See, e.g., Bankruptcy, U.S. AIR FORCE ACAD., http://www.usafa.edu/superintendent/
ja/bankruptcy.cfm?catname (last visited Oct. 9, 2012) (explaining that whether a bankruptcy filing can affect one's security clearance depends on various factors, including
"whether the bankruptcy was caused primarily by an unexpected event.., or by financial
irresponsibility"). The effect of a bankruptcy filing on an individual's ability to secure or
retain a job, however, is complex. While a bankruptcy filing may signal to a current or
prospective employer that an individual is financially irresponsible, see infra notes 116-136
and accompanying text, it may alternatively be interpreted as a positive path toward rehabilitation of the debtor's financial status because it combines debt forgiveness with debt
collection. See, e.g., Legal Office: Bankruptcy, supra (noting that filing for bankruptcy "may
actually be viewed as an indication of financial responsibility," because someone with size-
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these reasons, financial histories-including credit reports and scoreshave been described as some of "the most powerful determinants of
8
modern American consumer life."
In recent years, one widespread use of financial histories-employers' and licensing organizations' consideration of applicants' financial backgrounds-has attracted significant scrutiny. Legislators and
policymakers have questioned the logic and ethics of employers' and
licensing organizations' two primary uses of financial histories: (1) to
gauge an applicant's propensity to steal from customers or clients, 9 and
(2) to use an applicant's financial history as a barometer of financial
responsibility, which employers interpret as a reflection of her capacity
to serve as a responsible employee or licensee.' 0 Some federal and state
legislators have sought to limit employers' consideration of applicants'
credit histories absent a reasonably clear relationship between the applicant's financial transgression and his or her ability to perform the
responsibilities demanded by the position." Legal commentators have

able outstanding debts may pose a higher security risk than someone who has filed for
bankruptcy); see also Katherine Porter, The Pretend Solution: An EmpiricalStudy of Bankruptcy
Outcones, 90 TEx. L. REV. 103, 140 (2011) (citing an interview with a debtor who pursued a
Chapter 13 bankruptcy hoping to retain a security clearance). One bankruptcy judge
opined on the extent to which a bankruptcy filing could interfere with a debtor's future
employment prospects:
Bankruptcy is a serious step; it holds its stigmas still. It is a unique judicial
process where one is laid bare, financially. And remember this-it results in a
court record for future employers, creditors, friends, relatives and the public
to see. Would you grant a security clearance to one who cannot manage his
financial affairs and files bankruptcy? I only ask the question. Some would
and some would not.
In re Raymond, 12 B.R. 906, 907 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1981).
8 FELLOWES, supra note 1, at 2.
9See infra notes 101-115 and accompanying text.
10See infra notes 116-136 and accompanying text.
i1 Several states, including California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Oregon, and Washington, have passed laws limiting employers' consideration of credit reports.
CAL. LAB. CODE § 1024.5 (West Supp. 2012); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51tt (West Supp.
2012); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 378-2(a) (8) (LexisNexis Supp. 2011); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT.
70/10 (2010); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & ENHPL. § 3-711 (West Supp. 2011); OR. REv. STAT.
§ 659A.320 (2011); WASH. REV. CODE § 19.182.020 (2007); see also Use of Credit Information
in Employment 2011 Legislation, NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.
ncsl.org/issues-research/banking/use-of-credit-infor mation-in-employment-201 1-legis.aspx
(last updated Dec. 19, 2011) (outlining 2011 legislation in twenty-nine states limiting the
use of credit reports and credit history by employers). In 2009, federal legislators introdtuced the Equal Employment for All Act, which proposed to amend the Fair Credit Reporting Act to restrict employers' use of credit reports. H.R. 3149, 111 th Cong. (2009). As
I subsequently discuss, however, existing and proposed laws that restrict employers' use of
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voiced concerns about bar examiners' consideration of applicants' student loan debt levels and repayment capabilities in determining applicants' professional fitness.' 2 Some bankruptcy practitioners have suggested that the Bankruptcy Code's prohibition of public employers'
refusal to hire bankruptcy filers should be likewise applied to private
sector employers. 13 In response, employers have defended their right to
consider financial histories in the hiring process, arguing that they can
glean meaningful information about the merits and employability of
14
job applicants from applicants' credit reports.
In this Article, I consider whether, and to what extent, the law
should more rigorously limit employers' and licensing organizations'
consideration of individuals' financial histories. Should the law prevent
individuals with adverse credit histories, high debt loads, debt defaults,
or bankruptcies from being treated differently by employers or licensing organizations? What valid distinctions, if any, can be made among
members of these groups? In exploring these questions, I assess how
debtors' financial histories have become inextricable from their individual identities, whether the practice is a necessary and effective supplement to norms and laws encouraging debt repayment, the lack of
clarity surrounding consumers' ability to enter into financial transactions that maximize their welfare, and the importance of a robust financial history antidiscrimination norm to racial and economic equal15
ity. To traverse "the complex, shifting, and often muddy terrain" of

credit reports actually embrace-rather than reject-prevailing preconceptions about
debtors. See infra note 115 and accompanying text.
12 See, e.g., John Zulkey, Character& Fitness & Credit History: Failingthe Characterand Fitness Review over Student Loan Debt, 21 PROF. LAW., no. 1, 2011 at 4, 4-5 (arguing that law
students who have defaulted on their student loan obligations should not be disqualified
from practice and recommending that the American Bar Association adopt measures to
encourage law schools to reduce tuition and increase loan-repayment assistance).
13 Michael R. Herz, The Scarlet D: Bankruptcy Filingand Employment Discrimination, AM.
BANKR. INST. J., Apr. 16, 2011, at 16, 89; see 11 U.S.C. § 525 (2006).
14 See U.S. Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n, Meeting of Oct. 20, 2010-Employer Use of
Credit History as a Screening Tool [hereinafter EEOC, Oct. 20 Meeting Record] (statement of
Pamela Quigley Devata), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/10-20-10/ (last visited Oct. 9,
2012); Kathy Gurchiek, SHRM: Credit Checks Are Legitimate Screening Tool, Soc'v FOR HUMAN
RES. MGMr. (Nov. 2, 2010), http://www.shrm.org/about/news/Pages/LegitimateScreening
Tool.aspx; see also EEOC v. United Va. Bank/Seaboard Nat'l, No. 75-166-N, 1977 WL 15340, at
*15 (E.D. Va. Oct. 7, 1977) (finding that the use of preemployment credit reports by an employer in the bank industry was permissible so long as it was not racially discriminatory on its
face).
15 ANNA KIRKLAND, FAT RIGHTS: DILEMMAS OF DIFFERENCE AND PERSONHOOD 2 (2008).
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antidiscrimination law, I examine applicable "logics of personhood,"16 a
phrase that refers to a framework of antidiscrimination analysis that can
be used to assess whether particular groups are entitled to antidiscrimination protection.
After examining the empirical rationales for using financial history
in employment and licensing as well as the practice's adverse impact on
racial equality and social mobility, I recommend a significant expansion
in existing financial history antidiscrimination laws. In a novel application of behavioral economics to the area of credit reports and financial
history, I argue that the findings of behavioral economists suggest that
a stronger financial history antidiscrimination norm is necessary to
protect individuals from the consequences of decisions that increasingly appear more analogous to immutable characteristics that receive
more substantial protection under current antidiscrimination laws.
This Article is the first to conduct a broad normative analysis of
financial-history discrimination. 17 The Article considers not only employers' and licensing organizations' use of credit reports, but also their
use of other reports of financial histories, including, for example,
bankruptcy filings reflected in public records. As legislators continue to
consider whether or not to restrict employers' use of credit histories, it
is critical to engage in a more comprehensive analytical inquiry-one
that will inform legislators' and policymakers' conclusions about how
and to what extent to limit employers' access to information that has
for decades been perceived as relevant and helpful. The Article's objective is to generate a more nuanced and comprehensive debate about
the merits of reducing the role of financial history in an individual's

16 Id. at 2-3 (describing the logics of personhood as "forms of reasoning about what
persons are-specifically, ways we explain to each other how and why someone's traits
should or should not matter for judging what is really important about her").
17Existing scholarship has focused on discrete dimensions of financial history discrimination. See, e.g., Loren W. Brown, Credit Report: An Acceptable Aid to the HiringDecision ?,
39 W. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (2011); John C. Chobot, Anti-Discrimination Under the Bankruptcy
Laws, 60 AM. BANKR. L.J. 185 (1986); Roberto Concepci6n,Jr., Pre-Employment Credit Checks:
Effectuating DisparateInpact on Racial Minorities Under the Guise ofJob-Relatedness and Business
Necessity, 12 SCHOLAR 523 (2010); Deborah Thorne, PersonalBankruptcy and the Credit Report: Conflicting Mechanisms of Social Mobility, J. POVERTY, Oct. 17, 2008, at 23; Ruth Desmond, Comment, Consumer Credit Reports and Privacy in the Employment Context: The Fair
Credit ReportingAct and the Equal Employment for All Act, 44 U.S.F. L. REV. 907 (2010); Kelly
Gallagher, Note, Rethinking the Fair Credit Reporting Act: When Requesting Credit Reports for
"EmploymentPurposes" Goes Too Far,91 IowA L. REv. 1593 (2006).
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pursuit of a job, which is a resource that philosopher Anthony Appiah
18
has described as "essential to a dignified autonomous life."
Part I of this Article juxtaposes creditors' traditional use of credit
reports-to assess credit applicants' "creditworthiness" -and employers' and licensing organizations' non-credit uses of credit reports and
financial histories. It reviews the findings of several social science studies
that attempt to measure the relationship between an adverse financial
history and specific personality traits relevant to job performance.' 9 Part
II considers various arguments for and against establishing a stronger
antidiscrimination norm in the area of financial history. It considers a
critical question insufficiently explored in the legal literature: how and
whether policies embracing empirical observations about individuals
with adverse financial backgrounds can be reconciled with other important social goals, including the promotion of racial equality and social
mobility.20 Part III explains why a stronger financial history antidiscrimination norm is necessary to overcome key deficiencies in current
21
laws and is preferable to alternatives.
I.

THE INCREASING IMPORTANCE OF FINANCIAL HISTORY IN THE
PURSUIT OF CREDIT AND CAREER

A. Creditors' Use ofFinancialHistory
Traditionally, an individual's financial background has been used
primarily by creditors to decide whether and under what terms a consumer will receive a mortgage or other loan. Creditors have long used
consumer reports (more informally known as "credit reports") 22 to
evaluate consumers' eligibility for mortgages, credit cards, and other
credit products. Consumer reports contain a wealth of information

18 K. Anthony Appiah, Stereotypes and the Shaping of Identity, 88 CALIF. L. REv. 41, 46

(2000).

19See infra notes 22-153 and accompanying text.

20 See infra notes 154-279 and accompanying text.

21See infra notes 280-418 and accompanying text.
22 The term "consumer report" encompasses "credit reports" as well as reports issued
to non-creditor users of reports, including prospective insurers, employers, and landlords.
See Deborah Platt Majoras, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Protecting Consumers' Data:
Policy Issues Raised by ChoicePoint, Statement Before the Subcommittee on Commerce,
Trade, and Consumer Protection, Committee on Energy and Commerce, U.S. House of
Representatives 6-7 (Mar. 15, 2005), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2005/03/050315protecting
consumerdata.pdf.
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about American consumers, including personal information, 23 payment
history,24 inquiry history, 25 and public record information. 26 Some con-

sumer reports include credit scores, which are a numeral rating of a
consumer's "creditworthiness."' 27 Creditors purchase consumer reports
from consumer reporting agencies (commonly known as "credit reporting agencies" or credit bureaus"),28 organizations that create and
29
maintain such records on virtually every American adult.

Economists view credit reports as a critical risk-mitigation tool
since credit reports can help a credit grantor assess a prospective borrower's likelihood of repaying a particular loan.30 When a consumer
applies for credit, a creditor can analyze the applicant's financial history to reduce adverse selection problems. 3 1 Credit products-like insurance policies 32-may be more likely to attract riskier borrowers be23 Personal information includes a consumer's name, address, Social Security number,
date of birth, previous address, employer, and phone number. EVAN HENDRICKS, CREDIT
SCORES

& CREDIT REPORTS: How THE SYSTEM REALLY WORKS, WHAT YOU CAN Do 81-82

(2005).
24 Payment history details a consumer's record of repayment on her mortgage, auto
loans, installment loans, credit cards, and department store cards. Id. at 19.
25 A consumer report lists which employers and creditors requested the report within
the last two years. CHI CHI WU & ELIZABETH DE ARMOND, NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR.,
FAIR CREDIT REPORTING

§ 3.2.3.2 (7th ed. 2010).

Public record information includes tax liens, bankruptcies, court judgments, and
foreclosures. Id.
27 Id. As I note below, however, employers do not have access to credit scores; rather,
consumer reporting agencies provide employers only with the raw data in consumer reports. See infra note 65 and accompanying text.
28 The term "consumer reporting agency" is broader than the term "credit bureau." A
consumer reporting agency encompasses "credit bureaus" as well as many other entities
whose primary focus does not involve reporting consumer credit information to prospective creditors. See Wu & DE ARMOND, supra note 25, § 1.2.1. Examples of these consumer
reporting agencies include tenant screening bureaus and employment screening agencies.
Id.
26

29 ANTHONY RODRIGUEZ ET AL., NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., FAIR CREDIT REPORTING

§ 4.1 (5th ed. 2002) ("The three major agencies will have a file on virtually every adult
American .... ").
30 Robert M. Hunt, The Development and Regulation of Consumer Credit Reporting in America
4-5 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila., Working Paper No. 02-21, 2002), available at http://
wvww.phil.frb.org/research-and-data/publications/working-papers/2002/wpO2-21 .pdf ("The
availability of data on a universe of credit users ... makes it possible to develop sophisticated
models to select and price credit risk for unsecured consumer loans.").
31 See Fair Credit Reporting: Hearings on S. 823 Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. of the S.
Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong. 66 (1969) [hereinafter Hearings,FairCredit Reporting] (statement of Lewis B. Stone, Assistant Counsel to Governor Rockefeller, State of
New York) (explaining that credit reports allow "the costs of bad credit risks [to] be apportioned to those that are bad credit risks"); Hunt, supra note 30, at 4-5.
32 See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 47-48 (6th ed. 2012).
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cause any given credit applicant generally has more information than
do prospective creditors about that applicant's likelihood of defaulting
on a particular debt. 33 To minimize these information asymmetries and

reduce the risk that any given group of credit applicants will contain a
disproportionate number of individuals who are more likely to default,
creditors can use an applicant's credit history to differentiate between
more and less "creditworthy" individuals3 4 For example, a creditor
might decide not to lend to an applicant lacking a sufficiently long and
regular record of prompt debt repayment, or one whose outstanding
loan balances exhaust a relatively high percentage of her total credit
limits. 3 5 Alternatively or additionally, a creditor can reduce anticipated

losses by charging higher fees or interest rates to borrowers who appear
36
more likely to default.
Creditors utilizing credit reports also attempt to shape borrower
behavior by reducing moral hazard problems. 37 After a creditor has extended credit to a borrower, that creditor can deter the debtor from
defaulting by threatening to report any delinquency to one or more
credit bureaus.3 8 The more accurate and the more comprehensive the

33 See WORLD BANK & INT'L MONETARY FUND, FINANCIAL SECTOR ASSESSMENT: A HAND-

256-57 (2005), available at http://www.inf.org/external/pubs/ft/fsa/eng/pdf/chlO.
pdf ("Credit reporting addresses a fundamental problem of credit markets: asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders, which leads to adverse selection and moral hazard.");John M. Barron & Michael Staten, The Value of Comprehensive Credit Reports: Lessons from
BOOK

the U.S. Experience, in CREDrr REPORTING SYSTEMS AND THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 273,

276 (MargaretJ. Miller ed., 2003) ("Lending markets almost always display some degree of
information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders. Borrowers typically have more accurate information than lenders about their willingness and ability to repay a loan.").
34See Hunt, supra note 30, at 3-4.
35 What's in My FICO Score, How My FICO Score Is Calculated, MYFICO, http://www.my
fico.com/CreditEducation/WhatsInYourScore.aspx (last visited Oct. 9, 2012) (describing
the extent to which certain categories of information are used in calculating a consumer's
credit score).
36 The practice of charging riskier borrowers higher fees and interest rates is known as
"risk-based pricing." See, e.g., Susan Block-Lieb & Edward J. Janger, The Myth of the Rational
Borrower: Rationality, Behavioralism, and the Misguided "Reform" of Bankruptcy Law, 84 TEX. L.
REv. 1481, 1516 (2006) (discussing how creditors can maximize profitability through riskbased pricing and sub-prime lending); Patricia A. McCoy, Rethinking Disclosure in a World of
Risk-Based Pricing,44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 123, 126-27 (2007) (discussing risk-based pricing
in the home mortgage market).
37 See WORLD BANK & INT'L MONETARY

FUND, supra note 33, at 257 ("[Clredit-

reporting mechanisms strengthen incentives for borrowers to repay and thus reduce moral
hazard because late or nonpayment with one institution can result in sanctions from many
others."); Hunt, supra note 30, at 4.
38 See, e.g., WORLD BANK, GENERAL PRINCIPLES FOR CREDIT REPORTING 8 (2011), http://

siteresources.worldbank.org/FINANCIALSECTOR/Resources/CreditReporting-text.pdf
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information in a consumer's credit report, and the greater the number
of creditors and other entities who use credit reports in rendering
meaningful decisions about consumers, the more likely that (1) past
defaults will affect a borrower's future eligibility for loans, and that (2)
creditors' threats to report defaults to credit bureaus will shape con39
sumers' behavior.
Because they provide data with which creditors can develop models to predict and price credit risk, credit reports and credit scores have
been lauded for reducing delinquency rates, 40 dramatically increasing
the speed of the loan application process, 41 and contributing to a significant expansion of unsecured credit. 42 Credit reports have thus increased creditor profits, expanded consumers' access to credit, and
helped keep credit prices down. For these reasons, credit reports have
been interpreted (at least conceptually) as a win-win, benefitting con43
sumers and creditors alike.

(describing how credit reporting systems, databases of information on debtors, can "[s]erve
to discipline debtor behavior").
3'See Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects,
86 CALIF. L. RExV. 479, 483 (1998). In other words, "network effects" are present in the
credit reporting industry because consumer reports become more usefil and effective as
both the coverage of consumers and the number of participating creditors increase. Hunt,
supra note 30, at 6.
40 See Peter L. McCorkell, The Inpact of Credit Scoring and Automated Underwritingon
Credit Availability, in THE IMPACT OF PUBLIC POLICY ON CONSUMER CREDIT 209, 213 (Thomas A. Durkin & Michael E. Staten eds., 2002) (concluding that credit reports, compared
to judgmental evaluation methods, reduce delinquency rates by twenty to thirty percent).
41 See WORLD BANK & INT'L MONETARY FUND, supra note 33, at 257 (explaining that
credit reporting can increase efficiency by reducing the loan processing time, thereby
lowering costs); Wu & DE ARMOND, supra note 25, § 1.2.2 (noting that consumer reports
increase the speed of credit transactions because creditors have nearly instantaneous access to consumer reports).
42 See Barron & Staten, supra note 33, at 273 ("[C]redit bureau data have made a wide
range of credit products available to millions of households that would have been turned
down as too risky just a generation ago."); see also Use of Credit Information Beyond Lending:
Issues and Reform Proposals:HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Fin. lusts, and Consumer Credit of the
H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 125 (2010) [hereinafter Hearings, Beyond Lending]
(statement of Stuart K. Pratt, Consumer Data Industry Association) (noting that if creditors are forced to remove accurate data, consumer credit costs may increase, reducing the
availability of credit).
43See Wu & DE ARMOND, supra note 25, § 1.2.2 ("Consumer credit reporting can benefit both credit grantors and consumers."). This sentiment was also expressed in the legislative history of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t (2006), the federal
statute that regulates the consumer reporting industry. Hearings,Fair Credit Reporting, supra
note 31, at 1 (statement of Sen. William Proxmire, Chairman, S. Subcomm. on Fin. Insts.
& Consumer Credit) (explaining that "[t]here is no argument with the proposition that
both consumers and industry need an efficient and accurate credit reporting system").
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Many consider creditors' use of credit reports essential to the fair
and democratic distribution and pricing of credit. Credit reports seemingly impose a meritocratic system whereby those consumers who regularly repay their debts are eligible for the cheapest future loans. Before
credit scores were widely used, higher-risk borrowers (most notably,
communities of color) were more likely to be denied loans altogether, 44
and lenders used more subjective measures to evaluate prospective borrowers. 45 Credit reports have thus been perceived as instrumental to
social mobility (both internationally and domestically) and to the crea46
tion and viability of a strong middle class.
Creditors' use of consumers' financial histories has not been without controversy. Many argue that consumer reports are error-ridden, a
problem that can cause creditors and employers to make serious mistakes in rendering decisions about consumers and prospective employees. 47 Commentators also note that consumer reporting agencies inadequately protect consumers' privacy,48 which can contribute to identity
theft. 49 And others argue that the specific criteria used by creditors to
calculate credit scores have a disparate impact on minority communi50
ties.

44 FELLOWES, supra note 1, at 17 n.5 (explaining that the "high risk" market was largely
ignored before credit scores were invented).
45 Before the introduction of credit scoring, credit decisions were made "manually" by
a loan officer. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE Sys., REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON
CREDIT SCORING AND ITS EFFECTS ON THE AVAILABILITY AND AFFORDABILITY OF CREDIT 04 (2007) [hereinafter FED. RESERVE BD., CREDIT SCORING], http://www.federalreserve.
gov/boarddocs/rptcongress/creditscore/creditscore.pdf. This decision method, known as
"judgmental" underwriting, was subjective, inconsistent, and costly. Id.
46
WORLD BANK, supra note 38, at v ("Poor financial infrastructure [including a lack of
effective credit reporting systems] in many developing countries poses a considerable constraint upon financial institutions to expand their offering of financial services to underserved segments of the population and the economy.").
47 See infra notes 140-142 and accompanying text.
48 See, e.g., Hearings, Fair Credit Reporting, supra note 31, at 1-2 (statement of Sen.
Proxmire) (describing how the computerization of credit reports "opens the way toward a
gigantic national data bank which could include extremely personal information on every
American citizen").
49 Wu & DE ARMOND, supranote 25, § 1.2.2 (explaining that credit reporting agencies'
.extensive collection of information, and the vast numbers of consumers on whom they
report, creates serious concerns about the accuracy of information they keep and about
the adequacy of their measures designed to protect consumer privacy, including protection from identity theft").
50 See, e.g., FED. RESERVE BD., CREDIT SCORING, supra note 45, at 51 ("Others have expressed the view that the credit-scoring process itself and some of the factors within creditscoring models may disadvantage minorities or other segments of the population protected by fair lending laws.").
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Few, however, have questioned the central rationale underlying
creditors' consideration of financial histories: assuming that creditors'
methodologies are reliable, valid, and nondiscriminatory, 51 it is reasonable for a creditor to consider a consumer's borrowing history in deciding whether and under what terms to grant a consumer a future loan.
The nexus between a creditor's economic role-lending money to consumer borrowers-and its primary evaluative tool-reviewing a consumer's record of debt repayment-has been perceived as intuitively
logical and as robust.52 Commentators have thus generally questioned

how-not whether-creditors should consider applicants' financial his53
tories in deciding whether or not to extend credit.
Credit reports are designed to differentiate. They help creditors
draw relevant distinctions between otherwise anonymous debtors whose
relationship with current and former creditors is ambiguous or unknown. 54 What is less clea, however, is to what extent a consumer's financial history is relevant in assessing a prospective employee's merits, a
topic that I will explore in the following section.
B. Employers' and Licensing Organizations'Use ofFinancialHistory
Over the past several decades, the use of credit reports and financial histories has expanded beyond the financial domain, as financial
histories have been adopted as predictive and evaluative tools in various
non-credit settings. Insurance companies, for example, use consumer
reports in deciding whether to issue or cancel policies, determining the
terms of such policies, and pricing insurance rates. 55 Government
agencies use consumer reports to evaluate consumers' eligibility for
public assistance benefits. 56 Some professional licensing organizations,

51This is, of course, a critical assumption, and one that many have challenged. See infra
notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
52 See DEE PRIDGEN & RICHARD M. ALDERMAN, CONSUMER CREDIT AND THE LAW § 2:1
(2011) (explaining that when the "consumer applies for a car loan or a new credit card,
the consumer will normally fill out a credit application that requests a great deal of personal information" and that most consumers "accept this as necessary for the creditor to
determine whether or not they will be a good risk").
53 See id.; Edwin J. Griffith, Credit Reporting, Prescreened Lists, and Adverse Action: The Inpact of the Fair Credit Reporting Act and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 46 CAL. W. L. REv. 1,
62-63 (2009).
54 Hunt, supra note 30, at 4-5 ("[C]redit bureaus enable the maintenance of reputation effects in a market consisting of millions of otherwise anonymous borrowers." (citation omitted)).
55 Wu & DE ARMOND, sIpra note 25,
56

§ 7.2.5.

Id. § 7.2.6.
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like bar examiners, scrutinize applicants' financial histories in assessing
57
applicants' fitness to join certain professions.
Significantly, all of these groups utilize financial histories not to
assess a consumer's likelihood of repaying particular debts, 58 but to

predict or assess some other quality or behavior. In other words, with
non-credit uses of financial history, the intuitive link between the evaluative tool-review of a consumer's relationships with current and
former creditors-and these organizations' assessment goals is more
tenuous, or at least not immediately obvious. As a result, non-credit uses of financial history merit independent scrutiny.
The use of credit reports in the employment sector has become
commonplace. 59 An increasing percentage of employers consider applicants' credit reports in filling part- and full-time positions, treating
financial history as predictive of the personality traits that make an individual a good or bad employee. Employer surveys indicate that 60%
of employers utilized credit reports in 2010, 60 compared to 35% of employers in 2003,61 and 13% in 1996.62 Employers' and licensing organizations' use of financial histories may increase in leaner job markets,
when employers and licensing organizations search for additional ways
63
to differentiate efficiently between larger numbers of candidates.

57 Id. (discussing the permissible use of credit histories in the fields of law and medicine).

58See infra notes 79-95 and accompanying text (discussing how some licensing organizations may evaluate prospective licensees' financial histories to assess applicants' standing,
not to make substantive predictions about applicants' personality traits).
59 Financial histories may be used at any stage of the employment process. For instance,
they may be used to assess the merits ofjob applicants or new entrants to a particular profession or even to evaluate current employees for promotion or retention. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681b(b) (2006) (defining "consumer reports" to include those used for "employment
purposes"); id. § 1681a(h) (defining "employment purposes" as the use of a consumer report
to evaluate a consumer for employment, promotion, reassignment, or retention). This Article focuses primarily on the former use: scrutiny of the financial histories of those seeking to
obtain a new job or enter a particular profession. See infra notes 60-99 and accompanying
text.
60 Soc'y for Human Res. Mgmt., Background Checking: Conducting Credit Background Checks SHRM Poll 3 (Jan. 22, 2010) [hereinafter Background Checking], http://
www.shrm.org/Research/SurveyFindings/Articles/Pages/BackgroundChecking.aspx.
61 EVREN ESEN, Soc'Y FOR HUMAN RES. MGMT., WORKPLACE VIOLENCE SURVEY 19
(2004), available at http://www.shrm.org/Research/SurveyFindings/Documents/Workplace
%20Violence%20Survey.pdf (reporting that 35% of employers used credit checks in 2003,
compared to 19% in 1996).
62 Id.
63 See, e.g., Desmond, supra note 17, at 907-08 (explaining that the recent increase in
employers' use of credit reports might be a result of the recession and the high demand
for jobs).
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Significantly, although an increasing number of employers use
64
credit report data, employers generally do not utilize credit scores.
The three nationwide credit bureaus refuse to provide employers with
access to credit scores. 65 In reviewing an applicant's credit history and
assessing his or her relative merits, employers instead scrutinize particular pieces of adverse information, including bankruptcy filings and collection actions. 66 Although employers' interpretations of these raw data
may be idiosyncratic, surveys reveal some commonalities among employers. Approximately two-thirds of employers report that they are
likely to consider current outstanding judgments when determining
whether to extend ajob offer.67 Approximately half of employers report
that they are influenced by debts in collection. 68 One-quarter of employers consider bankruptcy. 69 Less than one in five employers report
that they consider high debt-to-income ratios, foreclosures, tax liens,
70
education-related debt, and medical debt.
Employers and employer advocates downplay the importance of
credit reports in the evaluation process. They contend that credit reports are used in a relatively small percentage of total credit evaluations. 71 According to some sources, only about

13%72 to 19% 7 3

of em-

ployers routinely perform credit checks on all job candidates.
64 See Leslie Callaway & Mark Kruhm, Servicemember Disclosure a Must on All Mortgages,
A.B.A. BANKINGJ., Oct. 2010, at 64, 64 (reporting that Equifax, Experian, and TransUnion
decline to provide credit scores to employers for hiring purposes).
65 Id. Credit bureaus do not share credit scores with employers, presumably because
credit-scoring algorithms are designed specifically for lending and not for other purposes.
One could make the same argument, however, about the raw data on credit reports. This
Article questions the logic and ethics of the importation to the employment setting of all
variations of a tool designed specifically for creditor use.
66 See infra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
67 Maureen Minehan, Could a Credit Check Land You in Court?, 28 Eatp. ALERT 1 (Feb. 8,
2011) (citing survey conducted by the Society for Human Resource Management).
68Id.
69 Id. Courts have interpreted the Bankruptcy Code's antidiscrimination provisions, 11
U.S.C. § 525(a)-(b) (2006), to authorize private, but not public, employers to deny employment to a current or former bankruptcy filer. See inzfra notes 325-402 and accompanying text.
70 Minehan, supra note 67.
71 See, e.g., Hearings, Beyond Lending, supra note 42, at 43-44 (statement of Stuart K.
Pratt) (testifying that credit reports are consulted in approximately 15% of all background
checks).
72 EEOC, Oct. 20 Meeting Record, supra note 14 (statement of Christine V. Walters) (testifying that only 13% of organizations conduct credit checks on all job candidates).
73 Wu & DE ARMOND, supra note 25, § 7.2.4.1.2 (stating that only 19% of employers
checked credit reports of all applicants in 1996, but that 47% of employers checked credit
reports of some applicants in 2009).
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Those who defend employers' use of credit reports also point out
that in most cases, credit reports are used only in the final stages of hiring and not to prescreen job applicants. 7 4 Likewise, employers do not
use credit reports in filling every position--only specific ones. 75 According to the Society for Human Resource Management (SHRM), employers generally conduct credit checks only for certain positions involving
financial or fiduciary responsibilities, senior executive positions, and
positions where employees will have access to highly confidential employee information. 76 As I discuss later, however, employers' use of financial histories to fill positions involving sensitive job responsibilities
rests on strong, unsupported preconceptions about debtor behavior,
including a belief that consumers with adverse financial backgrounds
are more likely to commit theft. 77 In addition, the use of financial histo-

ries to fill highly compensated and prestigious senior executive positions
may have a negative impact on racial equality and social mobility.78
Employers are not the only groups that consider applicants' financial histories. In addition, certain licensing organizations evaluate applicants' debt repayment histories in determining whether applicants
have satisfied specific professional membership qualifications. For example, state bar examiners consider applicants' debt levels and relationships with current and former creditors as part of character and
fitness evaluations. 79 Many states request a copy of or reserve the right
to pull a bar applicant's credit report. 80 In questionnaires sent to applicants' references as part of background investigations, some bar exam74

EEOC, Oct. 20 Meeting Record, supra note 14 (statement of Christine V. Waiters) (tes-

tifying that 57% of organizations initiate credit checks only after granting a contingent
offer, and 30% of organizations do so after ajob interview).
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 See infra notes 101-115 and accompanying text.
78 See infra notes 191-246 and accompanying text.
79 See NAT'L CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAM'RS & AM. BAR Ass'N, COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE
TO BAR ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS viii (2012), available at http://www.ncbex.org/assets/
media..files/Comp-Guide/CompGuide.pdf (describing "neglect of financial responsibilities" as "relevant conduct" in the assessment of an applicant's character and fitness).
60 See, e.g., ILL. ATTORNEY REGISTRATION & DISCIPLINARY COMM'N, RULES GOVERNING
THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND JUDICIARY IN ILLINOIS r. 5 (2007), http://www.iardc.org/
rulesadmissions.html (explaining that a character investigation and report will be prepared with information received from employers, former employers, colleges and universities, law schools, other bar admitting authorities, courts, law enforcement agencies, creditors, credit reporting agencies, former spouses and character references); Va. Bd. of Bar
Exam'rs, Applicant's Character & Fitness Questionnaire 15 (n.d.), http://www.vbbe.
state.va.us/pdf/LRC&FQuestion.pdf (requiring that applicants submit a recent credit
report with their Character and Fitness Questionnaires).
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iners ask employers, friends, colleagues, and professors whether or not
81
the applicant has ever filed for bankruptcy.
In one very controversial case, In re Application of Griffin, the Ohio
Supreme Court rejected a law school graduate's application to sit for
the bar exam because the applicant had neglected his financial obligations. 82 The applicant, who worked part-time at a public defender's of-

fice, owed $170,000 in student loan debt and $16,500 in credit card
debt at the time of his law school graduation. 83 The court concluded
that the applicant had exhibited financial irresponsibility in choosing
to remain in his part-time position in the hope that it would lead to a
84
full-time position following the applicant's passage of the bar exam.
The court indicated that, had the applicant instead sought a full-time
position, he could have more easily paid down his debts and could have
qualified for additional deferment of his student loan obligations. 85
Several months prior to the examining board's decision, the applicant had indicated that he intended to file for Chapter 13 bankruptcy,
but, by the date of the hearing, he had not yet filed. 86 The court sug-

gested that, even if the applicant had filed for bankruptcy, the outcome
of the case would not have been different.8 7 A bankruptcy filing, according to the court, would not have significantly improved the applicant's financial status because his student loan debt was nondischargeable. 88
In re Griffin may be an outlier. Many applicants who are denied
admission to the bar for exercising financial irresponsibility exhibit additional complicating problems, including, for example, criminal misconduct. 89 In re Griffin nonetheless reflects the dramatic ability of a licensing organization to scrutinize and second-guess not only an
81 See, e.g., Letter from Tara Henrikson, Ill. Bd. of Admissions to the Bar, to author (July 1, 2010) (on file with author).
82 943 N.E.2d 1008, 1010 (Ohio 2011) (per curiam).
83 Id. at 1009.
84Id. at 1010.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 1009.
87 See

id.

88 In re Griffin, 943 N.E.2d at 1009.
89 See, e.g., In re Application of Hyland, 663 A.2d 1309, 1316 (Md. 1995) (denying the
state bar application of a candidate who had failed both to file federal income taxes and to
honor his other financial obligations); see also In re Application of Stern, 943 A.2d 1247,
1257-59 (Md. 2008) (holding that a state bar applicant did not satisfy character and fitness
requirements because the applicant had (1) demonstrated financial irresponsibility (but
not criminal misconduct) by failing to disclose all adverse information on his bar application and (2) engaged in an inappropriate relationship with an underage female).
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applicant's financial decisions, but also his or her life choices. 90 As a
result, an applicant who has incurred tens of thousands of dollars in
debt and the opportunity cost of a law school education may potentially
be deprived entry into his or her chosen profession. Such an applicant
faces an economic catch-22: improvement in his or her financial standing is necessary to secure the license he or she needs to advance in the
profession, but meaningful improvement in his or her financial status
requires access to a job within his or her chosen field. While such policies may encourage debt repayment, 9 1 they may discourage the neces92
sary risk-taking that is often required to improve one's life standing.
In other professions-including medicine, dentistry, and teaching-some state licensing authorities consider whether or not applicants and existing licensees have defaulted on certain debts. 93 These
licensing organizations focus primarily, if not exclusively, on applicants'
records of repayment of three categories of debts: (1) student loans,
(2) taxes, and (3) familial support obligations, like alimony and child
support. 94 If an applicant has defaulted on one of these debts, some
licensing authorities will refuse to grant the candidate entry into the
profession until the applicant has promised to repay the loan. 95
In 2008, Congress passed a law, the Secure and Fair Enforcement
for Mortgage Licensing Act. ("SAFE Act"), which establishes heightened
registration requirements for mortgage loan originators. 96 The statute
requires mortgage loan originators to "demonstrate[ ] financial responsibility, character, and general fitness such as to command the confidence of the community and to warrant a determination that the loan

90 See In re Giffin, 945 N.E.2d at 1010.

91 See infra notes 156-190 and accompanying text.
92 See infra notes 228-246 and accompanying text.
93 See, e.g., Hoke v. Retail Credit Corp., 521 F.2d 1079, 1084 (4th Cir. 1975) (holding
that a physician's consumer report, which was issued to the state board of medical examiners after the physician applied for a license to practice medicine, was a "consumer report"
subject to the requirements of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA)); Jay Greene, Debt
Deadbeats Risk Losing Medical Licenses, Am.MED. NEws, Aug. 13, 2001, at 1-2, 4.
94 See infra notes 178-180 and accompanying text.
(3 Telephone Interview with Dr. Eileen Lewalski, Prof'l Affairs Manager, Nat'l Ass'n of
Bds. of Pharmacy (Feb. 29, 2012) (explaining that in Illinois and other states, a prospective
licensee's failure to pay child support and/or student loans can impact licensure); Telephone
Interview with Dr. Alex Siegel, Former President, Ass'n of State & Provincial Psychology Bds.
(Feb. 29, 2012) (explaining that some licensing boards may consider child support repayment history; however, this rule is not universal).
96
SA.F.E. Mortgage Licensing Act, Title V of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act
of 2008, Pub. L. 110-289, 122 Stat. 2654 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5116
(Supp. IV 2010)).
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originator will operate honestly, fairly, and efficiently."97 To fulfill these
goals, all applicants must submit a credit report to a nationwide mortgage licensing and registration system. 98 State authorities may consider
these reports in assessing applicants' financial responsibility.9 9
In subsequent sections, I explore whether employers' and licensing organizations' uses of financial histories are supported empirically
or whether the practice reflects more uninformed, stereotypical judgments about consumer behavior. I also consider to what extent this
practice may encourage debt repayment but have a deleterious impact
on social mobility and racial equality.
C. EmpiricalRealities: What Makes an Individual with an Adverse
FinancialHistory Different

What does a consumer's financial history reveal? How are those
with adverse financial histories different from the rest of the population, both as individuals and as employees? Employers and licensing
organizations articulate two primary justifications for considering applicants' financial histories: (1) they help employers gauge an applicant's propensity to steal from customers or clients (which I will refer to
as the "Fraud Hypothesis"), and (2) they reflect an applicant's level of
financial responsibility, which can help employers and others predict
how responsible he or she will be as an employee or licensee (which I
will refer to as the "Responsibility Hypothesis"). 100
As I discuss below, there is little to no evidence to support the
Fraud Hypothesis. There is, however, some evidence to support the Responsibility Hypothesis. The challenge for lawmakers and academics is
to fashion legal rules and antidiscrimination policies that sufficiently
take into account empirical realities (including their known and unknown limitations) without neglecting important countervailing normative policies.
1. The Fraud Hypothesis
Employers most frequently consult applicants' financial histories to
attempt to identify those who are more likely to commit theft or fraud
97 12 U.S.C. § 5104(b) (3).

Id. § 5104(a) (2) (A).
9 See Heather Hill Cernoch, NMLS Adds Credit Report Functionalityfor SAFE Act Compliance,
DsNEWs.coM (No\: 3, 2010), http://www.dsnews.com/articles/nmls-adds-credit-reportfunctionality-for-safe-act-compliance-2010-11-03.
100 See infra notes 101-136 and accompanying text.
98
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or to accept bribes. 10 1 Some employers, for example, have expressed
concern that an employee with financial problems is more likely to
embezzle money. 10 Additionally, some employers are apprehensive that
an overextended employee might be tempted to commit identity theft
by stealing customers' and others' personal and financial information.10 3 Employers frequently consult the financial histories of applicants who, in their jobs, would have access to cash or credit card information. 10 4 Similarly, bar examiners have suggested that applicants with
adverse financial histories are, as lawyers, more likely to steal from clients. 10 5 The federal government, in granting security clearances, considers those with adverse financial backgrounds to pose a higher security risk because they are presumed to be more susceptible to blackmail
and bribery.10 6 Consistent with these perceived risks, credit reporting
agencies market credit reports to businesses as prudent, money-saving
risk-mitigation tools.

10 7

Because the Fraud Hypothesis is widely em-

101EEOC, Oct. 20 Meeting Record, supra note 14 (statement of Michael Aamodt).
102 Drew DeSilver, Too Good a Look? Credit Histories Are Being Usedfor a Lot More Than Deciding Who Gets a Loan, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 27, 2000, at D1 ("Employers often justify checking
credit histories by citing the need to protect themselves from pilfering or embezzlement.").
103 See Hearings,Beyond Lending, supra note 42, at 44 (statement of Stuart K. Pratt) (explaining that a prohibition on employer use of credit reports would render employers,
other employees, and customers more vulnerable to fraud and identity theft).
104 See Background Checking, supra note 60, at 5 (reporting that ninety-one percent of
employers conduct credit background checks on employees charged with fiduciary and
financial tasks, including the responsibility of handling cash).
105 Lori E. Shaw, What Does It Take to Satisfy Characterand Fitness Requirements?, STUDENT
LAW., Oct. 2008, at 12. One bar examiner has stated:
I think the concern ultimately centers around the issue of protection of the
public. Before admitting someone to the bar, I believe that the members of
Character and Fitness Committees want to be sure that the financial pressures
on a new lawyer will not be such that the lawyer will be tempted to take advantage of a client ....
Id. at 14.
106 Sean Reilly, PersonalDebt Sinks More Clearances,FED. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2011, at 18 (explaining that a high debt load "could heighten someone's vulnerability to bribery or
blackmail"). Additionally, many federal government and federal contractor positions require employees to obtain a security clearance as a condition of employment. Genevieve
Loutinsky, Comment, The Needs of War and the Right to FairProcess in Seeking a Security Clearance, 19 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REv. 543, 543 (2010).
107 See, e.g., Qualify Employees, SARmA, http://www.sarma.com/solutions/qualify-employees
(last visited Oct. 26, 2012) ("Experts have suggested the cost of even one bad hiring decision
can be as much as $100,000 taking into account the time spent recruiting, hiring, and training, as well as the amount of time the job is left incomplete or performed poorly by an unqualified applicant. In addition, the financial cost from theft, violence, etc., can be enormous, not to mention the risk of damaging employee morale and the entity's reputation.").
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braced, employment attorneys have encouraged employers who use
consumer reports to include "sensitive responsibilities in job descrip08
tions" to avert possible discrimination claims.
As others have argued, though, the Fraud Hypothesis lacks meaningful empirical support. 10 9 Employers and employer advocates have
pointed to studies indicating that individuals who have committed financial crimes have experienced financial stress. 110 These studies, however, do not establish a general correlation between financial stress and
propensity to commit financial crimes because researchers lack a representative sample of job applicants."' Thus, it is unclear what percentage of all employees experiencing financial stress refrain from committing theft or fraud. In addition, a 2011 study published in the Journalof
Applied Psychology indicated that an employee's credit score was unrelated to workplace deviance (e.g., theft).112
The Fraud Hypothesis poses a significant challenge, because it is
widely entrenched in popular and legal culture. Because credit scores

These claims have gained traction during the recent recession because employers-eager to
cut costs and avoid unnecessary losses-may have embraced credit reports as an indispensable screening tool. See Heather Huhman, When Einployers Look into Your Credit History, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP. (July 22, 2011), http://moneyutsnews.com/money/blogs/outside("Some employers
voices-careers/2011/07/22/when-employers-look-into-your-credit-history
believe people with large debts or credit problems could be more likely to steal or commit
fraud, which organizations can't afford, especially in today's down economy."); Jim Sanders,
Ban on Checking Credit ofJob Applicants Clears Assembly, SACRAMENTO BEE (May 19, 2011, 4:49
PM), http://blogs.sacbee.com/capitoalertlatest/201 1/05/ban-on-checking-credit-of-job.htmrl
(citing one state legislator as saying that credit reports can help employers reduce future
litigation and loss, and "[i]n small business, every little bit counts").
108 Mary Swanton, Employers Can Deny Jobs Based on Bankruptcy, INSIDECOUNSEL, Mar. 1,
2011, at 56, 57, available at http://www.insidecounsel.com/2011/03/01/employers-can-denyjob-based-on-bankruptcy.
109 See, e.g., U.S. Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n, Meeting of May 16, 2007-On Employment Testing and Screening, [hereinafter EEOC, May 16 HearingRecord] (statement of Adam
T. Klein), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/archive/5-16-07/ ("To our knowledge, credit checks as a basis for employment decisions is a practice validated by no studies .... ").
110See, e.g., EEOC, Oct. 20 Meeting Record, supra note 14 (statement of Christine V. Walters).
I See id.
112Jeremy B. Bernerth et al., An Empirical Investigation of DispositionalAntecedents and
Performance-Related Outcomes of Credit Scores, 97 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 469, 474 (2012). Because employers do not use credit scores, see supra note 64 and accompanying text, study
results on credit scores may not be easily extrapolated to the employment setting. Nevertheless, there is good reason to believe that employers' use of the raw data in credit reports
has a disparate impact on minorities. For example, minority groups file for bankruptcy
more often than do non-minorities. See TERESA A. SULLIVAN ET AL., THE FRAGILE MIDDLE
CLASS: AMERICANS IN DEBT 234 fig.7.4 (2000) (showing a greater percentage of minority
homeowners in bankruptcy compared to non-minority homeowners in 1997).
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are strongly correlated with race,11 3 the Fraud Hypothesis may perpetuate an insidious stereotype that minorities are more likely to commit
crimes.11 4 Even those states that have passed laws limiting employers'
use of credit reports permit employers to consult financial histories if
the position involves (1) access to an expense account or corporate
debit or credit cards, (2) the exercise of fiduciary responsibility (e.g.,
the power to issue payments, collect debts, transfer money, or enter into contracts), (3) access to third parties' personal or financial information, (4) access to confidential information, including trade secrets, or
(5) access to valuable assets, including, for example, library or museum
collections or prescription drugs. 1 5 These categories can be interpreted broadly to encompass a large percentage of jobs. Thus, existing
financial history antidiscrimination laws embrace-rather than rejectthe Fraud Hypothesis.
2. The Responsibility Hypothesis
Many employers have long believed that an applicant's financial
history contains clues that can help employers determine whether an
applicant possesses key traits related to responsibility and job productivity. These employers might attribute excessive indebtedness and default
to poor financial planning, an inability to control one's impulses, or
apathy toward fulfilling one's financial obligations or promises. 116 Some
employers have concluded that financial weakness may make an appliSee infra notes 191-223 and accompanying text.
EEOC, May 16 Hearing Record, supra note 109 (statement of Adam T. Klein)
("[G]iven that African American applicants are more likely to have bad credit, this notion
of risk of theft also fosters a shameful racial stereotype.").
113

114

115

See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51tt (West Supp. 2012) (excluding positions

that involve access to personal or financial information other than information commonly
provided in a retail position; fiduciary responsibilities; access to an expense account or
corporate cards; access to confidential business information, including trade secrets; or
access to the employer's nonfinancial assets valued at $2500 or more, including museum
and library collections and prescription drugs); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/10 (2011) (excluding from the general ban on employers' use of credit history positions that involve
access to cash or marketable assets valued at $2500 or more and positions that involve access to confidential information); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-711 (LexisNexis Supp.
2011) (exempting positions that involve access to personal information; fiduciary responsibility to the employer (including the power to issue payments, collect debts, transfer
money, or enter into contracts); access to an expense account or corporate debit or credit
cards; or access to other confidential business information, including trade secrets).
116 See Huhman, supra note 107, at 99 ("Your credit report gives employers a sense of
your responsibility level in your personal life. If you haven't done anything to improve your
credit or [if you] continue to be irresponsible with money, it's a bad sign for employers
looking to hire you.").
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cant a less reliable employee (i.e., one who shows up to work less frequently or fails to fulfill job obligations). 117 As one executive articulated, "[i]f you cannot organize your finances, how are you going to
118
responsibly organize yourself for a company?"
This view-which I describe as the "Responsibility Hypothesis"presupposes that
individuals who have a habit of not following through on previous promises (as represented by unpaid balances or late
payments) or not having the foresight to plan ahead (as represented by recent financial activity that requires borrowing of
money) would be reasonably expected to continue such behavior in the future, including in the workplace. 119
Until quite recently, employers relied primarily on anecdotal evidence
to support this claim. 120 In the aftermath of the recent recession, however, which has been marked by protracted high unemployment, em121
ployers' use of financial histories has come under increasing scrutiny.
This has triggered calls for additional empirical analyses of the validity
122
of the practice.
Employers have long relied on personality tests and other assessment tools to help deduce whether or not an applicant possesses cer123
tain traits that will help a firm or organization reach its stated goals.
The question presently posed to social scientists is whether financial
histories, like personality tests, validly and consistently predict the likelihood that applicants will exhibit important work-related qualities and
behaviors, like conscientiousness, agreeableness, and discipline.
Few studies directly address this question. A 2011 study published
in the Journal of Applied Psychology attempted to measure the correlation
between credit scores and specific personality traits relevant to job performance. 124 Using supervisor assessments, credit (FICO) scores, and
117See EEOC, Oct. 20 MeetingRecord, supra note 14 (statement of Richard Tonowski).
118 Diane E. Lewis, Qualification:Must Have a Good Credit History, Bos. GLOBE, Sept. 5,

2006, at El.
"9 Bernerth et al., supra note 112, at 470.
120 Id. at 469.
121 See, e.g., Brown, supra note 17, at 2-3; Concepci6n, supra note 17, at 524; Desmond,

supra note 17, at 907.
122 See, e.g., Bernerth et al., supra note 112, at 470 ("Despite the claims of practitioners
and credit reporting agencies, there exists virtually no empirical evidence to confirm or
refute the proposed antecedents and outcomes of credit scores.").
123 See Gregory M. Hurtz &John J. Donovan, Personality andJob Performance: The BigFive
Revisited, 85J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 869, 869 (2000).
124 Bernerth et al., supra note 112, at 470.
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personality data collected from employees, researchers concluded that
conscientiousness, task performance, and citizenship behaviors were
positively correlated with credit scores. 125 These findings might lend
limited support to the idea that credit scores and responsibility are
linked.
This study has noteworthy limitations, though. For example, the
researchers in this study observed a correlation between certain personality traits and credit scores. 126 Employers, however, do not use credit scores in the assessment process. 27 They have access only to specific
lists of financial events, like defaults, collection actions, and bankruptcy
filings.' 28 As a result, employers might process these raw data very differently (and far less consistently) than do consumer reporting agencies' algorithms. 12 9 Thus, the tentative conclusions of this study are not
necessarily applicable to real-world uses of credit reports by employers
130
and licensing organizations.
Likewise, this study's sample may have been insufficiently representative because it measured only the personality traits of individuals who
were currently employed. The study (presumably for feasibility reasons)
did not measure the conscientiousness levels of individuals who were
currently seeking a job or who were otherwise unemployed. 131 As a result, the study might have overstated the connection between credit
score and conscientiousness, since presently employed individuals may
inherently be more likely to be evaluated positively by their supervisors.
Various commentators have responded to similar studies by arguing that employees should be judged primarily, if not exclusively, by
their ability to perform a given job, and not by any other metrics. One
consumer advocate who testified before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) posed the following dichotomy: "Funda125 Id. at 472-73. Employees who exhibit "organizational citizenship behavior" might,
for example, give advance notice when they are unable to work and assist other employees
who have heavy workloads. Id.
126

Id.

See supra notes 64 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 64-70 and accompanying text.
'2 In this way, employers' use of the raw data in credit reports resembles judgmental
underwriting, a subjective and inconsistent assessment method that creditors utilized before credit scores were introduced. See FED. RESERVE BD., CREDrr SCORING, supra note 45,
at 04.
130 For example, employers appear to focus primarily-if not exclusively--on specific
adverse information (e.g., bankruptcy filings or collection actions). Unlike creditors, employers may not necessarily consider the length of a consumers' credit history or the lack
of a credit history. See Background Checking, supra note 60, at 7.
131See Bernerth et al., supranote 112, at 472.
127

128
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mentally, the issue at stake is whether workers are fairly judged based
on their ability to perform a job or whether they're discriminated
against because of their credit history."13 2 The difficult and unexplored
question that lawmakers and social scientists must address is whether
financial histories are, in fact, valid measures of crucial qualities-like
conscientiousness-that are manifested in both credit reports and in
the workplace. In other words, can credit histories-used by approximately sixty percent of employers 133 and an increasing number of licensing organizations-reflect personality traits that are part and parcel
of that set of skills and qualities that prospective employees market to
employers? If so, how should the law (particularly antidiscrimination
law) respond?
Likewise, even if key traits like conscientiousness are manifested in
financial histories, and even if these traits have some predictive validity
in the employment setting, it is crucial to assess to what extent these
qualities are within an individual's control. Questions about the extent
to which an adverse financial history should be considered in assessing
a prospective employee's merits implicates a central and often intractable question in many antidiscrimination debates: whether or not the
quality that makes a group different is immutable (i.e., outside of the
group's control) or mutable (i.e., capable of being avoided, or at least
minimized, through different life choices). The law affords greater protection against discrimination to those who cannot strip themselves of
those characteristics that make them unique.1 3 Some might interpret
financial misfortune as more analogous to traditional Title VII categories like race and sex. Those at the opposite end of the spectrum, in
contrast, would perceive many-if not most-consumers who have experienced financial misfortune as more comparable to other groups
who have struggled to convince policymakers and the public that those
essential qualities that make them different cannot be controlled-or
can be controlled only with great difficulty. 135 Later in the Article, I
132

EEOC, Oct. 20 Meeting Record, supra note 14 (statement of Chi Chi Wit) (emphasis

added).
133
134

See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (citing Korematsu v. United States, 323

U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (explaining that racial classifications deserve heightened scrutiny);
Sharona Hoffman, The Inportance of Inmutabitity in Employment DiscriminationLaw, 52 WN1.
& MARY L. Rav. 1483, 1487 (2011).
135See, e.g., White v. Kentuckiana Livestock Mkt., Inc., 397 F.3d 420, 426 (6th Cir. 2005)
(holding that an individual who has filed for bankruptcy is different from one who seeks
protection under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 because of her race or sex or,
under the Age Discrimination Act, because of her age).
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consider to what extent behavioral economists' findings suggest that
consumer choices are predictably and systematically irrational, and thus
136
more analogous to traditional immutable characteristics.
3. Additional Rationales
Employers and licensing organizations consult applicants' fmancial histories for a variety of secondary reasons, in addition to fraud and
irresponsibility risk-detection.13 7 To assess the potential direct discriminatory impact of these additional practices, one may consider to what
extent employers or licensing organizations are using applicants' financial histories to make substantive predictions about applicants' propensity to exhibit deviant behavior or job irresponsibility. In other words, it
is helpful to consider to what extent these rationales rely on the Fraud
or Responsibility Hypotheses.
Some of employers' additional uses of financial history are less dependent on the Fraud and Responsibility Hypotheses and, for this reason, may pose less significant normative complications. Others, however, are closely intertwined with these rationales and reflect the extent
to which the Fraud and Responsibility Hypotheses have, even in the
absence of conclusive empirical evidence, become entrenched in societal views and narratives about consumer behavior.
a. CreditReports as an Information-VerificationTool
Some employers use credit reports for a seemingly innocuous administrative purpose: to help verify applicants' identities or other information listed on job candidates' application forms or resumes. l38 Employers have, for example, used credit reports to confirm applicants'
Social Security numbers, current and former residences, and employ9
ment history.13
Employers' use of credit reports as an information-verification
method is arguably less problematic from a discrimination standpoint,
since this use is not substantially premised on either the Fraud or Responsibility Hypothesis. It is possible that employers who identify discrepancies between applicants' credit reports and applications or resumes may make negative inferences about candidates' honesty or
trustworthiness. Employers using credit reports primarily or exclusively
infra notes 247-279 and accompanying text.
infra notes 138-153 and accompanying text.
138EEOC, Oct. 20 Meeting Record, supra note 14 (statement of Richard Tonowski).
136See
137See

139Id.
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as an information-verification tool, however, are not necessarily also
using an applicant's financial history to make substantive judgments
and predictions about whether applicants possess certain favorable or
unfavorable personality traits. As a result, this use of financial history, in
and of itself, does not implicate the antidiscrimination issues addressed
in this Article.
Nonetheless, using credit reports as a routine informationverification tool is ill-advised. Consumer reports are replete with errors. 140 Inaccuracies are common because consumer reporting agencies

are compensated by users of reports, like creditors and employers, and
not by consumers themselves. 141 As a result, apart from concerns about
litigation or regulatory enforcement, consumer reporting agencies do
not have a significant direct financial incentive to limit inaccuracies.
Because consumer reporting agencies often erroneously report both a
consumer's biographical information and her payment history, employers should instead use other methods, like background screening,
42
to verify basic information supplied by applicants.
Although employers' use of credit reports as an informationverification method does not directly and substantially implicate either
the Fraud or Responsibility Hypothesis, employers' administrative use
of credit reports may nonetheless raise ancillary discrimination concerns. Employers' use of biographical information contained in credit
reports increases the likelihood that employers, if only out of perceived
convenience or a desire to maximize the value of their expenditures on
reports, will also consult applicants' payment histories to make inferences about applicants' personality traits. Thus, employers' use of consumer reports as an information-verification mechanism may, by facilitating the predictive use of reports, legitimize and entrench consumer
reports as a useful substantive assessment tool in the employment set140 See ALISON CASSADY & EDMUND MIERZWINSKI, U.S. PUB. INTEREST RES. GRP., MISTAKES Do HAPPEN: A LOOK AT ERRORS IN CONSUMER CREDIT REPORTS, (2004), http://cdn.

publicinterestnetwork.org/assets/BEevuvl9a3KzsATRbZMZlw/MistakesDoHappen2004.pdf
(concluding in a study of 154 consumers in thirty states that 79% of credit reports contained
one or more errors, and that 25% of the reports contained an error serious enough to cause

a denial of credit).
141 See Marcy E. Peek, Beyond Contract: Utilizing Restitution to Reach Shadow Offenders and
Safeguard Information Privacy, inl SECURING PRIVACY IN THE INTERNET AGE 137, 139 (Annpam Chander et al. eds., 2008) (describing third-party data brokers, like consumer reporting agencies, as "shadow offenders," because they lack prixity of contract with consumers
and therefore often escape liability for mishandling consumers' data).

142 See EEOC, Oct. 20 Meeting Record, supra note 14 (statement of Richard Tonowski)
("[Basic biographical information] might be obtained from background screening providers without the applicant's financial details.").
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ting. For this reason, even the seemingly benign administrative use of
credit reports is relevant to an antidiscrimination analysis.
b. Debtor-CreditorRelationship Between Employer and Applicant
In addition, some employers may refuse to hire an applicant who
has defaulted on one or more debts owed to the employer or to a related corporate entity.143 It is possible that these decisions rest heavily on
the Fraud or Responsibility Hypothesis, since the employer, upon consultation of an applicant's financial background, may have made certain
adverse predictions about the applicant's likelihood of committing
fraud or theft or about his or her ability to serve as a responsible employee. Additionally or alternatively, such decisions may be perceived as
an attempt
to punish debt default, a justification I examine later in this
144
Article.

c. Negligent Hiring
Some employers and credit reporting agencies argue that, without
a thorough review of a candidate's financial background, an employer
might be exposing itself to claims of negligent hiring. 145 If an employee
ultimately commits fraud or theft, the victim might sue the employer,
claiming that the employer was negligent in failing to conduct a more
thorough review of the applicant's criminal or financial history.146 A
more comprehensive background check, a plaintiff might argue, might
have reflected noteworthy "red flags" that could have suggested that
closer supervision of the employee was necessary.
As I discuss later, however, there are few to no cases in which employers have been successfully sued for failure to scrutinize an employee's financial background, suggesting that an antidiscrimination
rule is crucial not only to protect debtors from adverse actions that rest
143 Such a situation may arise when an employee of a large institution, like a hospital
or a university, incurs a debt at that institution (i.e., as a patient or a student, respectively).
See, e.g., Leonard v. St. Rose Dominican Hosp. (In re Majewski), 310 F.3d 653, 654 (9th Cir.
2002) (ruling on an antidiscrimination claim of a hospital employee, who was fired after
he defaulted on debts owed to the hospital and after the hospital learned that the employee intended to file for bankruptcy).
144 See infra notes 156-190 and accompanying text.
145 Background Checking, supra note 60, at 10 (reporting that twenty-seven percent of
employers indicated that their primary reason for conducting credit background checks is
to reduce liability for negligent hiring).
146 See Hansen v. Bd. of Trs. of Hamilton Se. Sch. Corp., 551 F.3d 599, 609-10 (10th
Cir. 2008) (discussing the torts of negligent hiring, retention, or supervision); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 317 (1965) (discussing the negligent hiring theory).
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on incorrect assumptions about debtor behavior, but also to protect
employers from the perceived necessity of reviewing information that,
in spite of its tenuous connection to an employee's merits, is commonly
147
perceived as indispensable to a thorough risk-mitigation review.
d. Licensing Organizations Qua Creditors

Some licensing organizations that consult the credit histories of
licensing applicants are not necessarily using them to assess the candidate's capacity to be responsible or his or her propensity to commit
theft. Rather, some licensing organizations' evaluative role is more
analogous to that of (1) a creditor assessing a prospective borrower's
financial standing, or of (2) state or federal regulators seeking to ensure that the banks they charter can meet safety and soundness re148
quirements.
For example, some states require prospective contractors, as a
condition to the award of a contractor's license, to submit personal
credit reports to licensing bodies. 149 The objective of this financial assessment is to ensure that the contractor will be able to secure necessary contract bonds, obtain necessary financing for construction or installation projects, and pay all subcontractors. 1 0 In addition, some
medical board examiners may consult applicants' credit reports to en51
sure that applicants will be able to secure liability insurance.
Licensing organizations have a broader mandate than do employers. They can regulate certain professions to ensure the public's health,
147 See infra notes 411-413 and accompanying text.
148 For example, the Office of the Comptroller of Currency must certify that it has
considered the following factors in deciding whether to approve an application for a national bank charter: (1) the financial history and condition of the bank, (2) the adequacy
of its capital structure, (3) the bank's future earnings prospects, (4) the general character
and fitness of its management, (5) the risk presented by the bank, (6) the convenience
and needs of the community to be served by the bank, and (7) whether or not the bank
has complied with all provisions of the National Bank Act and whether or not its corporate
powers are consistent with the purposes of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act. 12 U.S.C.
§ 1816 (2006).
149See, e.g.,
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 489.115(5) (b) (West Supp. 2012) (requiring an applicant
for a contracting certificate to submit a credit report "that reflects the financial responsibility
of the applicant and evidence of financial responsibility, credit, and business reputation of
either himself or herself or the business organization he or she desires to qualify").
150See id. ("The board shall adopt rules defining financial responsibility based upon
the applicant's credit history, ability to be bonded, and any history of bankruptcy or assignment of receivers.").
151 See COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-64-301 (2011) (requiring, as a condition of licensure, that
every physician or dentist establish financial responsibility, which requires maintaining
commercial professional liability insurance coverage).
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safety, and welfare.1 52 As a result, it may be reasonable for licensing bodies to scrutinize applicants' financial histories-not to make predictions
about an applicant's conscientiousness or likelihood of committing
fraud or theft, but to ensure that the prospective licensee will satisfy the
financial prerequisites necessary for him or her to succeed in the venture. In such cases, because the licensing organization is not primarily
using an applicant's financial history to make substantive assessments
about the applicant's non-credit behaviors, this use of financial histories
may not necessarily directly implicate the antidiscrimination questions
153
considered in this Article.
II.

JUSTIFICATIONS FOR AND AGAINST EXPANSION OF A FINANCIAL
HISTORY ANTIDISCRIMINATION NoRm

Social science has played a significant role in helping shape legal
policy, and it will continue to play a meaningful role in determining the
proper scope of employers' and licensing organizations' right to consult applicants' financial histories. The task of antidiscrimination law,
however, is to balance empirical realities-including their known and
unknown limitations-with various other factors, including the role
employment practices have on systematically disadvantaged populations. In this Part, I consider to what extent an expanded financial history antidiscrimination norm affects other social goals, including the
154
promotion of debt repayment, racial equality, and social mobility. I
also consider to what extent the findings of behavioral economists suggest that the underlying traits reflected in financial histories may be
more immutable than neoclassical theorists have been willing to concede, thereby rendering individuals with adverse financial histories
155
more deserving of antidiscrimination protection.
A. Discriminationas Deterrence:PromotingDebt Repayment
As Professor Anna Kirkland has explained, the distinctions that
employers make between employees are often justified by reference to
152

See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 489.101 (West 2006) ("The Legislature deems it neces-

sary in the interest of the public health, safety, and welfare to regulate the construction

industry.").
153 There may exist, however, a false dichotomy between business and consumer financial ventures. For example, many individuals file for bankruptcy after their small busi-

nesses fail. See Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, FinancialCharacteristicsof Businesses in Bankruptcy, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 499, 535 (1999).
154 See infta notes 156-246 and accompanying text.
155 See infra notes 247-279 and accompanying text.
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a goal of deterrence.1 56 Employers may differentiate among applicants
to promote certain traits and behaviors perceived as beneficial to the
organization and to the surrounding community. 157 Many employers
and licensing organizations that scrutinize applicants' financial histories may choose not to hire applicants who have filed for bankruptcy or
who have defaulted on a certain type of financial obligation, because
this is conduct that they or others may view as harmful or reprehensible. 158 Employers' and licensing organizations' use of financial histories
thus functions as an extralegal deterrent to debt default-a sanction
1 59
that can serve to supplement and enhance existing legal penalties.
One may point to several examples of how employers' and licensing organizations' use of financial histories directly encourages and enforces debt repayment. In the legal profession, for example, state bar
examiners conduct "character and fitness" assessments of law school
graduates to determine whether applicants are sufficiently ethical to
serve the public as attorneys. 160 As part of this inquiry, some bar examiners evaluate applicants' credit reports, income tax returns, past-due
debts, and litigation histories.1 6' A candidate's failure to demonstrate a
sufficient level of financial responsibility may bar her from joining the
legal profession. 162 In preparation for the character and fitness review,
supra note 15, at 10.
Id. (discussing the role of deterrence in the context of employing overweight people and explaining, "[i]f fatness is unhealthy and comes from eating too much, then it is
behavior that could be deterred and we would all be better off").
158 See infra notes 160-163, 173-180 and accompanying text (discussing licensing organizations' consideration of familial support obligation, tax, and student loan defaults).
159 See Dan M. Kahan, Signaling or Reciprocating?A Response to Eric Posner'sLaw and Social
Norns, 36 U. RICH. L. Rev. 367, 367-68 (2002) (arguing that normative behavioral standards are superior to legal regulation).
160 See Michael K. McChrystal, A Structural Analysis of the Good Moral CharacterRequirement for Bar Admission, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 67, 92-96 (1984) (discussing the role of
financial malfeasance on admission to the bar and arguing that courts and bar admission
boards should be wary of denying admission on that basis).
161 E.g., ILL. ATTORNEY REGISTRATION & DISCIPLINARY COMM'N, supra note 80 (explaining that a character investigation will be conducted with information received from employers,
former employers, colleges and universities, law schools, other bar admitting authorities,
courts, law enforcement agencies, creditors, credit reporting agencies, former spouses, and
character references); BarExamination Instructions, W. VA. JUDIC ARY, BOARD OF L. EXAMINERS,
(last visited
http://-vw.courtswvgov/legal-community/Bd-of-Law/exam-instructions.html
Oct. 9, 2012) (requiring applicants to submit a current credit report); Utah State Bar Admissions-Frequently Asked Questions, OFFICE OF BAR ADMIssIONs, http://www.titahbar.org/admissions/admissionsjfaq.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2012) ("As part of the background investigation
the Utah State Bar will obtain a credit report for every Applicant."); Va. Bd. of Bar Exam'rs,
supra note 80, at 10 (requiring applicants to the Virginia bar to submit a current credit report
and driving record with all Character & Fitness Questionnaires).
162 See, e.g., In reApplication of Griffin, 943 N.E.2d 1008, 1010 (Ohio 2011) (per curiam).
156 KIRKLAND,
157
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law students have thus been encouraged to live frugally, to set up payment plans with creditors, and generally to "rehabilitate" their financial
163
images as early as possible.
Employers' debt-enforcement function is also manifested in those
facts and circumstances that employers view as mitigating factors in assessing various flaws in applicants' financial histories. For example, in
scrutinizing candidates' financial backgrounds, some employers claim
to give some applicants an opportunity to explain orjustify bankruptcy
filings or collection actions that appear on applicants' reports. 164 If an
applicant who has been the subject of one or more collection actions
reports that he or she has instituted repayment plans with these creditors, the applicant's defaults are more likely to be pardoned. 165 These
repayment attempts are more likely to be interpreted as acts of conciliation. If the applicant has attempted to redeem him or herself, some
employers claim that the applicant's default is more likely to be forgiven.
The Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), the federal statute that
governs employers' use of credit reports, institutionalizes employers'
debt-enforcement function by allowing employers-like creditors-to
scrutinize applicants' financial histories. 166 Employers, like creditors,
167 Signifiare described as "permissible users" of consumer reports.
cantly, the statute requires employers to share with applicants disclosure notices that serve as "teachable moments" for consumers.1 68 Under
the FCRA, an employer who intends to deny employment to an applicant based in whole or in part on information in a credit report must
first disclose that fact to the applicant in a pre-adverse action notice
that includes a copy of the credit report.1 69 The goal of the adverse action requirement is to provide job candidates with an opportunity to
correct any consequential errors in the report, but it also has a strong
supra note 105, at 14.
Roberts, Close-Up on Screening: Use of Criminal Records and Credit Histories in Hiring
Decisions Is Coming Squarely Under the Legislative and Policy-Making Microscope, HR MAG., Feb.
2011, at 23, 26 ("Most [employers] discuss unfavorable reports with candidates to check
accuracy and understand the context .... .").
165 See U.S. Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n, Meeting of Oct. 20, 2010-Employer Use
of Credit History as a Screening Tool, Transcript of Meeting at 32 [hereinafter EEOC, Oct.
20 Meeting Tr.] (Devata), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/10-20-10/transcript.cfm
(last visited Oct. 9, 2012) ("If applicants are attempting to repay debt, that's a positive.").
166 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t (2006).
167 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d) (1) (c) (incorporating § 1681b(a) (3) (B)).
168 See Wu & DE ARMOND, supra note 25, § 8.5.1.1 (explaining that "teachable mo163Shaw,
164Bill

ments" are those that might prompt consumers to improve their credit history).
169 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3) (A) (i)-(ii).
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deterrent effect. 70 The statute, in effect, mandates that employers directly associate in an applicant's mind a potential job rejection and his
or her financial transgression.
Supporters of employers' use of financial histories might contend
that the practice serves a salutary economic function. Frequently, the
costs of default are borne by society as a whole, externalized in the form
of increased interest rates, a decreased availability of credit, and higher
prices for consumer products and services. 171 Because default is an infraction against the community, it is arguably economically and socially
beneficial for employers to help enforce debts indirectly by serving, in
effect, as creditors' proxies. In the distribution of a critical resource like
a job, one might argue that employers thus have every right to reward
those who live within their means. Job applicants have an incentive to
comply with such a nonlegal sanction, since doing so enhances their
72
attractiveness to employers.
One might argue that employers can exercise their debtenforcement functions in a nuanced way, thereby mitigating the potentially harsh consequences of a strict application of the rule. Presumably,
employers can be logical, reasoned, and empathetic in their consideration of applicants' financial backgrounds. Employers can also scrutinize
financial histories in a way that advances specific normative goals. In
assessing a particular debt default, some employers and licensing organizations consider specific factors, including (1) the apparent mutability or immutability of the consumer's predicament, (2) the degree of
leverage
a creditor can assert in debt collection, and (3) other social
17 3
values.

In assessing the immutability of the consumer's default, debt load,
or bankruptcy filing, a creditor may consider to what extent the consumer was capable of avoiding the status or situation that triggered her
adverse financial situation. Some employers, for example, claim to dis170 SeeWu

& DE ARmOND, supra note 25, § 8.5.1.1 ("If any of the information about the

consumer is inaccurate or misleading, the consumer may try to reverse the adyerse action
by correcting or explaining the third party information.").
171 See Block-Lieb & Janger, supra note 36, at 1484 (explaining that rational choice
economists argue that lenders in competitive credit markets cannot pass on the costs of
default and bankruptcy to high-risk borrowers, a problem that triggers either credit rationing or an increase in the cost of credit).
172 Alex Geisinger, Are Norms Efficient? Pluralistic Ignorance, Heuristics, and the Use of
Norms as Private Regulation, 57 ALA. L. REv. 1, 19 (2005) ("The general model of rational
norm formation describes individuals as being attracted to one another because they associate positive outcomes with those with whom they cooperate.").
173 See infra notes 174-180 and accompanying text.
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regard any defaults on medical debt.174 These breaches may be considered less objectionable, since consumers cannot necessarily easily avoid
the health problems that trigger their need to borrow money to pay for
medical expenses. Employers may also take a more forgiving view of
financial problems triggered by divorces, separations, and job layoffscircumstances that employers are less likely to associate with irresponsi1 75
bility and profligacy.
An employer may likewise consider a creditor's leverage over a
particular debtor. If a creditor is perceived to be more powerless in collecting a particular debt, an employer (or, more likely, bar examiner or
other member of a professional licensing organization) may be more
sympathetic toward the creditor and thus more inclined to enforce the
obligation indirectly by scrutinizing an applicant's financial history. For
example, a debtor's default on a student loan may be considered particularly problematic because student loans are very large unsecured
debt obligations. A student does not pledge any collateral to secure her
repayment of a loan used to pay for tuition. One may argue that, with176
out a strong debt repayment norm, defaults would increase.
Finally, an employer or licensing organization might consider other social values that affect the relative status of a particular debt. 177 For
example, many professional licensing organizations appear to regard
certain debts-like income taxes 178 and familial support obligations 179-as sacrosanct. This perspective reflects the favored or privi174 Legislative Position, Md. Chamber of Commerce, SB 132, Job Fairness Act 1 (Feb. 2,
2011), http://www.mdchamber.org/legislative/bills/pdfs/SB132.pdf (explaining that most
employers disregard information about medical bills).
175 EEOC, Oct. 20 Meeting Tr., supra note 165, at 32 (Devata).
176 See Rafael I. Pardo & Michelle R. Lacey, The Real Student-Loan Scandal: Undue Hardship Discharge Litigation, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 179, 180-81 (2009) (explaining that in 1976,
Congress, based on evidence of perceived abuses, amended the bankruptcy laws to make
student loans dischargeable in only limited circumstances). In effect, however, lenders'
leverage over student borrowers is significant, since, among other things, student loans are
generally nondischargeable in bankruptcy, 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a) (8) (A)-(B) (2006), and tax
refunds may be intercepted to pay defaulted federal loans, 31 U.S.C. § 3720A (2006).
177 These normative judgments about the relative merits of particular debts may loosely parallel those reflected in the rules by which the Bankruptcy Code distributes limited
assets to a debtor's creditors. See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a) (1)-(10) (listing the relative priorities
of specific creditor claims).
178 Press Release, Iowa Bd. of Med. (Apr. 19, 2011), http://medicalboard.iowa.gov/
Press/2011/04 -19 2011.pdf (suspending the medical license of an Iowa physician who
had defaulted on his taxes).
179 Child Support Enforcement Mandate, MD. BOARD PHYSICIANS, http://www.mbp.state.
md.us/pages/child-support.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2012) (explaining that the Maryland
Board of Physicians is required to suspend the license of any licensee or to deny a license
to any applicant who has defaulted on child support obligations).
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leged status of particular creditors. Familial support claimants are provided with more protection because of the "social primacy of family
welfare" and because these claimants are "unable effectively to pass on
the loss."180 Tax obligations enjoy a privileged status because state and

local governments have significant leverage in debt collection.
It is critical, however, to assess whether-and to what extent- employers' and others' use of financial histories actually promotes debt
repayment.18 ' That is not an easy question to answer. Some may argue
that employers' use of financial histories, in penalizing applicants who
have defaulted on their debts, encourages debtors to work harder to
reconcile with their creditors. For example, it is possible that Congress's
inclusion of an antidiscrimination provision in the Bankruptcy Code
contributed to the relaxation of the "stigma" consumers attach to bankruptcy filings.18 2 The relaxation of the bankruptcy stigma, some argued,
in turn resulted in a dramatic increase in the number of bankruptcy
filings between the 1970s and early 2000s. 183 Thus, many might contend
that the ability of employers to discriminate against debtors enhances
debt repayment by discouraging debt default.
It is possible, however, that the practice may have the opposite effect. A debtor who faces too great of a burden to repay his or her creditors may have an incentive to work less and to consume more leisurean item that a creditor cannot attach, and that an employer cannot
pressure the employee to repay.1 4 Employers' and licensing organizations' consideration of financial histories may thus create incentives for
180 Margaret Howard, A Theory of Discharge in Consumer Bankruptcy, 48 OHI-O ST. L.J.
1047, 1057 (1987).
181See Geisinger, supra note 172, at 26 (arguing that "optimism regarding norm efficiency is greatly exaggerated").
182 See, e.g., Rafael Efrat, Bankruptcy Stigma: Plausible Causes for Shifing Norms, 22 EMORY
BANKR. DEV. J. 481, 496-97 (2006); Angela Littwin, The Affordability Paradox: How Consmer
Bankruptcy's Greatest Weakness May Account for Its SurprisingSuccess, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1933, 1946-49 (2011) (describing the debate about whether a reduction in the bankruptcy
"stigma" contributed to a historic and dramatic increase in the number of bankruptcy filers).
183Todd J. Zywicki, Institutions, Incentives, and Consumer Bankruptcy Reform, 62 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 1071, 1108 (2005) (explaining that several changes made in the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, including the adoption of § 525 (the antidiscrimination provision), may have
triggered "[a] change in social norms regarding bankruptcy"). Significantly, however, the
Bankruptcy Code's antidiscrimination provision is extremely weak, belying the notion that
it contributed to a relaxation of the bankruptcy stigma. See infra notes 325-380 and accompanying text.
184See Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HARV. L. REv'.
1393, 1420 (1985) (explaining that forcing individuals to pay debts out of future income
can have perverse effects by encouraging individuals to pursue leisure instead of prodtLictive activity).
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applicants to reduce their productivity levels, which can trigger externalities borne by taxpayers, dependents, and others.185
Commentators have made similar arguments in analyzing coercive
creditor remedies (like garnishment) and the bankruptcy discharge.
Because excessive garnishment and strict restrictions on access to bankruptcy may decrease debtors' productivity, at least one commentator
has argued that restricting garnishment and preserving debtors' access
to a nonwaivable bankruptcy discharge may have a salutary economic
effect.' 8 6 Similarly, reducing employers' ability to enforce debts strictly
through an antidiscrimination rule may actually increase economic
18 7

productivity.

The most compelling argument against the debt-enforcement rationale is that it conflicts with the "functional individualist" framework
that dominates employment law. 88 Pursuant to this normative framework, employees should be judged by their ability to perform their jobs,
and not by any other metrics. 189 Employers' implicit focus on debt enforcement seemingly expands and redefines the requirements of a given position, requiring prospective employees to shape their behavior in
a way that, in most cases, appears to do little to enhance or improve
their job skills. A good credit history is arguably unrelated to one's abil-

185 Cf id. at 1418-24 (describing the externalities that would result from imposing limitations on the right to discharge personal debts in bankruptcy).
186 Id. at 1424.
187 The argument that discrimination against debtors by employers may reduce economic productivity does not by itself, however, justify a complete prohibition on employer
discrimination. Rather, it suggests that limitations on indirect debt enforcement by employers (through discrimination) may be necessary to reduce the risk that externalities will
result. In the context of creditor remedies,

[o] ne might argue ... that coercive remedies will exacerbate the externality
problem if the effect of enforcing the remedy (such as wage garnishment) is
to cause debtors to quit their jobs. This might occur if the difference between
the level of public welfare benefits and the allowable exemption from garnishment were so small that it was not worth it for debtors to work for the difference. This point, however, does not argue for prohibiting wage assignments altogether. Rather, it implies that wage exemptions must be set
sufficiendy above the relevant welfare entitlements so that a significant incentive to work remains.
Cf Robert E. Scott, Rethinking the Regulation of Coercive CreditorRemedies, 89 COLUM. L. REv.
730, 772 n.139 (1989).
188 See KIRKLAND, supra note 15, at 7.
189 Id.
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ity to wait on customers, to drive a taxi, or to practice law. 190 A rationale
concerned with debt enforcement seems tangential to the discrete goal
of producing stronger, more qualified applicants. Placing pressure on
job applicants to present a healthy financial image requires them to
reallocate a portion of their time and resources to ends that do not
produce a more efficient, more educated, or more skilled employee. In
this way, allowing employers and licensing organizations to consider
financial histories may ultimately impede-not enhance-the normative goal of promoting debt repayment.
B. CurtailingRacial Inequality
Financial viability and independence require access to credit as
well as affordable loan terms. Throughout much of U.S. history, however, many racial and ethnic minorities have been denied one or both
of these critical components of a healthy, stable financial life. Depending upon market forces, social pressures, and applicable laws, lending
practices have often operated, for reasons frequently unrelated to creditworthiness, either to deny credit to minorities,1 9' or to grant credit to
192
minorities on more unfavorable terms.
In light of the importance of access to credit to basic functioning in
society, the law prohibits creditors from discriminating against racial and
ethnic minorities and other protected groups. Based on evidence that
various groups-particularly women-had long faced difficulty accessing credit, 193 in 1974 Congress passed the Equal Credit Opportunity Act
(ECOA).194 The ECOA prohibits creditors from discriminating against
applicants on the basis of sex, marital status, race, color, religion, na190 But see supra notes 116-136 (describing claims that credit reports are valid measures

of traits like conscientiousness. I collectively refer to such claims as the "Responsibility
Hypothesis").
191 PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 52, § 3:10 (describing how minorities have been
denied mortgages at a rate higher than that of similarly situated non-minority applicants).
192 For example, in the years preceding the subprime mortgage crisis, minorities received mortgages that were more likely to end up in default. See, e.g., Charlie Savage, Countrywide Will Settle a Bias Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2011, at B1. In December 2011, the U.S.
Department ofJustice settled a discrimination suit against Countrywide, a mortgage lender
that charged higher fees and interest rates to minority borrowers than to white borrowers
who posed the same credit risk. Id. Countrywide also steered minority borrowers into costly subprime mortgages when white borrowers with similar credit profiles received regular
loans. Id.
193 NAT'L COMN'N ON CONSUMER FIN., CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE UNITED STATES 152-

53 (1972).
194 Pub. L. No. 93-495, 88 Stat. 1521 (1974) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691
et seq. (2006)).
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tional origin, age, receipt of public assistance income, or the good-faith
1 95
exercise of any right under other consumer credit protection laws.
The ECOA's success rate has been mixed, primarily because of the challenges plaintiffs face in proving discrimination. 196 Nonetheless, in passing the ECOA, Congress has recognized both (1) how indispensable
access to credit is in modern America, and (2) how creditors' consideration of impermissible criteria can serve to financially disenfranchise a
large segment of the American population.
Access to a job is even more important to one's financial welfare
than is access to mortgages and other loans, since a steady income is
required to fulfill one's basic needs and is a prerequisite to access to
197
credit. Because of a strong correlation between race and credit score,
employers' use of financial histories in the employment setting has thus
triggered a problem similar to the one addressed by Congress in the
ECOA. Although creditors under the ECOA are barred from discriminating against individuals because of race and other factors, employers
and licensing organizations-who control access to jobs-are generally
authorized to consider credit reports-directly correlated with race-in
the licensing and employment process. 198
Various studies on credit scores have revealed stark disparities between minorities and non-minorities. A 2000 study by Freddie Mac, for
example, revealed a strong correlation between race and credit
score. 199 A 2007 study by the Federal Reserve Board found that blacks
and Hispanics have lower credit scores than do non-Hispanic whites
and Asians. 200 Likewise, a 2006 Brookings Institute study showed that
the higher the concentration of racial or ethnic minorities in a county,
the more likely the county's average credit score will be low.201 The

195
96

15 U.S.C. § 1691 (a).

1 PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supranote 52,

§§ 3.1,

3.7.

197See infra notes 199-206 and accompanying text.

198 Applicants, however, may sue under the ECOA if facially neutral creditor practices
had a disparate impact on one or more protected groups. See Cherry v. Amoco Oil Co., 490
F. Supp. 1026, 1030 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (holding that ECOA plaintiffs may seek relief under
the "effects test"). Although employers do not use credit scores, there is good reason to
believe that employers' use of the raw data in credit reports has a disparate impact on minorities. See supra note 112.
199See EEOC, May 16 HearingRecord, supra note 109 (statement of Adam T. Klein) (citing the 2000 Freddie Mac National Consumer Credit Survey).
200 BD. OF GOVERNORS

OF THE

FED.

RESERVE Sys., REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON CREDIT

80-81 (2007),
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/rptcongress/creditscore/creditscore.
pdf.
201FELLOWES, supra note 1, at 9.
SCORING AND ITS EFFECTS ON THE AVAILABILITY AND AFFORDABILITY OF CREDIT
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Brookings Institute study does not suggest that racial differences between counties cause these differences in scores, nor does it not control
for important variables-including income-that may contribute to the
association between race and credit score. 20 2 Rather, this correlation
more broadly reflects the many historical disparities between whites
and minorities in access to high-quality education, well-paying jobs, and
affordable loans. 20 3 Disparities in income and education may also affect

consumers' ability to understand and compare loan terms. 20 4 Additionally, the large gap in scores may be attributable to credit bureaus' historic failure to incorporate in their credit scoring algorithms nontraditional sources of credit history information-including payday loan
histories, utility payments, and rental payments. 20 5 Although the Brookings Institute study did not control for income, other studies that have
done so have identified race as the single most robust predictor of credit scores. 206
The racial impact of employers' use of financial histories may be
partially ameliorated by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Under
Title VII, employers' use of credit history-a seemingly neutral practice-is prohibited if the practice has a disparate impact on a protected
group. 207 As the Supreme Court explained in 1971 in Gigs v. Duke Power Co., seemingly neutral practices are discriminatory "if they operate to
20 8
'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices."
The EEOC has long recognized that employers' use of credit reports can have a disparate impact on minority applicants. Beginning in
the 1970s, the EEOC issued several decisions finding that employers
violated Tide VII by using credit reports as tools in the employeescreening process.2 09 In a 1971 case, a bank chose not to hire an African
202 See id. at 9-10, 18 n.31.
203 Id. at 10.
204 Id.
205 Wu & DE ARMOND, supra note 25, § 14.9.1 (6th ed. 2006). In recent years, however,

more creditors have begun including nontraditional sources of credit information in alternative credit scoring models. See, e.g., Lenders Across Industries Validate FICO Expansion
Score's Power, FICO (Feb. 2012), http://www.fico.com/en/FlResourcesLibrary/LendersSuccess_2249CS.pdf.
206 See, e.g., BRENT KABLER, Mo. DEP'T. OF INS., INSURANCE-BASED CREDIT SCORES: IMPACT ON MINORITY AND Low INCOME POPULATIONS IN MISSOURI 1-2 (2004), http://in-

surance.mo.gov/reports/credscore.pdf.
207 Title VII describes as "an unlawful employment practice" an employer's (1) failure
or refusal to hire, or (2) discharge of any individual with respect to compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,

sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1) (2006).
2008
401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971).
209 Concepci6n, supra note 17, at 533.
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American male as a computer operator "in part because of a relatively
poor credit record."2 10 More recently, the EEOC filed a lawsuit against
Kaplan Higher Education Corporation, claiming that the company's
use of credit histories in the hiring process had a disparate impact on
211
African Americans.
Under Tide VII, proof of a disparate impact on a protected group
is insufficient to enjoin the challenged practice or procedure. 212 An
employer may continue its challenged practice if the employer can establish that the practice is job-related and consistent with business necessity.21 3 To utilize this defense successfully, the employer must show

that the challenged practice relates to an important business need or to
the employee's ability to do the job.21 4 Even if the employer satisfies this
burden, liability can still be imposed if the plaintiff can establish the
existence of a less discriminatory alternative.2 18
Employers have successfully persuaded courts that the use of credit
reports in employment may be necessary if employees have access to
cash-a use of the business necessity defense that rests heavily on the
largely unsupported Fraud Hypothesis. 2 16 In EEOC v. United Virginia
Bank, decided in 1977, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia concluded that a bank was justified in conducting preemployment credit checks, since "the banking business is a fiduciary
business ...where there is a good deal of cash openly handled."217 In
Bailey v. DeBard, a 1975 case, the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Indiana ruled that it was appropriate for the Indiana State
Police Department to make hiring decisions based on character investigations that included a review of credit histories. 218 The court concluded
that such a review was relevant to a police officer's job performance because an adverse financial status might trigger a greater attraction to

210EEOC Decision No. 72-427, 1971 WL 3943, at *1 (Aug. 31, 1971).

211 Complaint at 2-3, EEOC v. Kaplan Higher Educ., Inc., No. 1:10-cv-02882-PAG, 2010
WL 5157837 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 21, 2010).
212 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (1) (A) (i) (codifying the disparate impact theory articulated
in Criggs); see Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430-32.
219 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (1) (A) (i) (2006); see Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431 ("The touchstone is business necessity.").
214 CHARLES A. SULLIVAN & LAUREN M. WALTER, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW
AND PIRACTICE § 4.01 (2009); see Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 587-88 (2009); Griggs,
401 U.S. at 431.
215 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (1) (A) (ii).
216 See supra notes 101-115 and accompanying text.

217 No. 75-166-N, 1977 WL 15340, at *15 (E.D. Va. Oct. 7, 1977).
218 No. IP 74-458-C, 1975 WL 227, at *17 (S.D. Ind.July 31, 1975).
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"the criminal element."219 Even those states that have recently passed
laws limiting employers' use of credit reports have codified as business
necessities the use of financial histories to vet applicants for positions
involving access to money, the exercise of fiduciary responsibilities, or
220
access to confidential information.
For these and other reasons, Title VII has failed to fully protect
individuals from the discriminatory effects of the use of credit reports
in hiring. Although courts generally recognize that employers' use of
financial histories may be challenged on a disparate impact theory, relatively few courts have dealt directly with such actions. 221 The relative
rarity of Title VII claims may be attributable to the fact that applicants
may be rejected for undisclosed reasons. 2 22 Specifically, it is unclear to
what extent employers comply with a requirement under the FCRA that
they notify applicants if credit reports played a role in the employers'
decision not to hire the applicant. 223 In other words, it is possible that
employers use credit reports as a factor in the hiring process, but fail to
so acknowledge, thereby making it harder for plaintiffs to prove that
the use of credit reports resulted in discrimination.
The inadequacies of Title VII claims highlight the need for a
stronger financial history antidiscrimination norm to protect the interests of traditionally disadvantaged groups, including racial minorities.
The currently very competitive marketplace has triggered a game of
"musical chairs" whereby workers must compete with others for a limited number of positions. It is critical to ensure that limited social goods
like jobs are not reallocated pursuant to criteria shown to perpetuate
inequality and to be tenuously related to job performance.

219 Id.

220See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
221 Donna M. Malin, Use of Credit Histoiy in Employment Decisions,Nat'l Conference on Equal
Emp't Opportunity Law (Mar. 2008), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/laborjlaw/meetings/2008/2008.eeo malin.authcheckdam.pdf. Although no federal
court has held that pre-employment credit checks have a disparate impact on racial minorities,
some have held that the use of general background investigations that include inquiries into
the applicant's financial history does violate Title VII. Concepci6n, supra note 17, at 534-35
(citing United States v. City of Chi., 549 F.2d 415, 432 (7th Cir. 1977); Dozier v. Chupka, 395 F.
Supp. 836, 851-52 (S.D. Ohio 1975)).
222 EEOC, May 16 HearingRecord, supra note 109 (statement of Adam T. Klein) ("[A) n
applicant rejected for having an insufficiently positive credit record typically will not know
that a never-disclosed employer credit-history check is the reason.").
223 See infra notes 287-295 and accompanying text (discussing the adverse action notice requirements imposed by the FCRA).
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C. PromotingSocial Mobility and FinancialRecovery
Closely related to the concern that employers' and licensing organizations' use of financial histories can perpetuate racial inequality is
the risk that the practice poses an affront to social mobility. Employers'
and licensing organizations' consideration of financial histories, as I
discuss below, may impact social mobility in three general ways. 2 24 First,
the practice may impact the distribution of particular jobs among individuals of lower socioeconomic backgrounds.2 25 Second, it may place
downward pressure on these individuals' wages. 226 Third, the practice
may represent a more symbolic affront to social mobility by signaling to
consumers that the effects of their financial decisions have serious collateral consequences-ones that extend beyond the realm of access to
2
and cost of credit.

27

1. The Effects of Credit History on Socioeconomic Status
Employers' use of financial histories in the hiring process may have
a disproportionate impact on individuals of a lower socioeconomic status, since there exists a correlation (albeit imperfect) between income
and credit history.228 Thus, employers who use credit reports as a selection tool may be adversely impacting poorer individuals' ability to ascend to positions of greater status and wealth. Although credit reports
are commonly used in filling low-level retail positions, 22 9 they are also
frequently used to help fill management roles, including, for example,

224See
225See
226See
227See

infra notes 228-246 and accompanying text.
infra notes 228-233 and accompanying text.
infra note 234 and accompanying text.
infra notes 235-246 and accompanying text.
228 Fumiko Hayashi & Joanna Stavins, Effects of Credit Scores on Consumer Payment Choice
13 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Bos., Discussion Paper No. 12-1, 2012), available at http://
www.bos.frb.org/economic/ppdp/2012/ppdpl2Ol.pdf ("Demographic characteristics are
highly correlated with credit score even after controlling for financial difficulty variables
and card status. Older consumers and higher-income earners tend to have a higher credit
score."). But cf Kurt Eggert, The Great Collapse: How Securitization Caused the Subprime Meltdown, 41 CONN. L. REv. 1257, 1271 (2009) ("Credit scores do not exactly correlate with
income, in that high-income borrowers may have low credit scores, and vice versa, depending on their payment histories.").
229 See, e.g., Credit Builders Alliance, Credit Builders Toolkit, Employers and Credit Fact
Sheet 1 (n.d.), http://www.creditbuildersalliance.org/files/employers-and-creditfact-sheet
pdf ("According to the 2003 National Retail Security Survey, conducted by the University of
Florida, 41% of retailers used pre-screening credit checks, with another 10% of retailers are
[sic] planning to start.").
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CEO and CFO positions. 230 In hiring faculty members and administrators, some universities consult candidates' credit reports. 231 Even several
state laws that limit employers' uses of credit reports nonetheless authorize employers to use credit reports to fill certain leadership or management roles. 23 2 These are all positions of consequence--ones that reward

successful applicants with meaningful remunerative or symbolic benefits. Thus, to the extent that poorer applicants may have worse financial
histories, they may be penalized in the assessment process. The practice
may also deter poorer applicants from applying for such positions,
thereby reducing the representation of individuals of a lower socioeconomic status in the management ranks.
Employers might argue that even if their use of financial histories
reduces social mobility, its independent effect may not be quantitatively
significant. It seems likely that other factors-including access to education and race-play a more substantial role in impacting, both over
time and at the application stage, which candidates receive which positions. Although the poor ineluctably face greater challenges in ascend233 it
ing to more prestigious or more highly compensated positions,
seems probable that this impact takes place gradually. In other words,
employers' and licensing organizations' consideration of financial histories may pose only a marginal or incremental barrier to upward social
mobility. While this would not be a reason to enjoin antidiscrimination
efforts, it might reduce the relative urgency of promoting antidiscrimination reform.
2. Suppression of Wages
Even if employers' use of financial histories has a de minimis independent effect on the distribution of specific jobs, the practice may
more generally and insidiously impair social mobility by suppressing
230

See Background Checking, supra note 60, at 5 (reporting that forty-six percent of

employers surveyed conducted background checks to evaluate job candidates for senior
executive positions).
231 See David Evans, Crimninal-Background Checks, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (May 28, 2008,

1:42 PM), http://chronicle.com/blogs/onhiring/criminal-background-checks/570.
232 See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-711 (LexisNexis Supp. 2011) (authorizing employers to use credit reports to fill a position that "is managerial and involves setting
the direction or control of a business, or a department, division, unit, or agency of a business").
233 See GARTH

L.

MANGUM

ET AL.,

THE PERSISTENCE OF POVERTY IN THE UNITED

14 (2003) (discussing how children who grow up in poverty experience adverse
long-term consequences in academic achievement, educational attainment, health, criminal justice behavior, and social behavior long into their adult lives).
STATES
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the wages of those with adverse financial histories. 23 4 Employers recognize that applicants with poor financial histories may be more likely to
accept lower salaries, since these individuals (1) suffer a competitive
disadvantage in the application process, and (2) depending on their
specific financial circumstances, may more urgently require a steady
income source. As a result, job applicants with adverse financial histories-regardless of their precise socioeconomic status-may find it
more difficult to recover from financial upheaval.
3. Symbolic Affront to Social Mobility
It is also possible that the practice's most direct affront to social
mobility stems from its deterrent and symbolic role, suggesting that the
goals of debt repayment and social mobility are in tension with one another.235 Philosopher Michael Walzer's description of "complex equality" illustrates how the use of credit scores-correlated heavily with
wealth 23 6 and race 237-poses a philosophical challenge to equality and
fairness. 238 Walzer contends that in a society, "[n] o social good x should
be distributed to men and women who possess some other good y
merely because they possess y and without regard to the meaning of
x. "239 Walzer describes social goods as membership, security and welfare, money and commodities, office, hard work, free time, education,
240
kinship and love, divine grace, recognition, and political power.
Thus, to facilitate complex equality, it would be unjust to allocate a social good like ajob or membership in a particular profession based upon individuals' possession of positive financial histories-which are
heavily correlated with income and race.
To prospective job applicants, the use of financial histories is
densely symbolic. A credit report-designed specifically by and for
creditors-has been transplanted to numerous noncredit settings, raising concerns-particularly during a weak economy-that the effects of
calamity and financial distress are being unfairly and unnecessarily
234 See Hayashi & Stavins, supra note 228, at 13 (discussing how higher-income individuals tend to have higher credit scores).
235 See supra notes 156-190 and accompanying text; infra notes 236-246 and accompa-

nying text.
236 Hayashi & Stavins, supra note 228, at 13.
237 See supra notes 191-223 and accompanying text.
238 See MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OFJUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM
3-4 (1983).
239 Id. at 20.
240 See generally id. (dedicating a chapter to each of these social goods).
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compounded. Applicants may perceive this practice to "kick them when
they're down," thereby perpetuating income inequality and slowing
down financial rehabilitation following a financial shock. To a job applicant, the consequences of financial lapses are seemingly amplified,
24
having consequences above and beyond their immediate "sphere." 1
The practice may be perceived not only to compound financial
misfortune, but also to penalize lower- and middle-class consumers for
unsuccessful entrepreneurial and other ventures. When an employer or
licensing organization reviews an applicant's credit history, that employer or licensing organization is retrospectively and bluntly assessing
the risk-taking that is sometimes required to improve one's life standing. Particularly during periods of high unemployment, individuals
with dim job prospects make consequential entrepreneurial wagers in
their lives-including, for example, starting small businesses2 42 or assuming significant educational debt.243 A sizeable proportion of these
bets will fail. 244 If employers and licensing organizations can consider

financial history in the hiring process, the consequences of these past
entrepreneurial wagers become broader and more enduring than an
individual could likely have predicted at the moment he or she originally assumed the financial risk.
Employers' consideration of financial histories may serve to magnify and compound the effects of financial decisions and events, making
it more difficult for individuals to escape the effects of bankruptcies,
collection actions, and other adverse financial circumstances. Without
the application of a robust financial antidiscrimination norm, the promise of social mobility-an American ethos-is undermined. At least one
commentator has suggested that social mobility is overrated as a policy
241 See

id. at 20.

242 See Laura Petrecca, Recession, Layoffs Fuel Many to Start Small Businesses, USA ToDAY,
(Sept. 18, 2009, 12:25 PM), http://www'usatoday'com/money/smallbusiness/startup/weeklexploring-small-business-options.htm (describing that approximately ten percent of jobseekers who gained employment during one recessionary period did so by launching their
own businesses, and describing that the failure rate for small businesses is exceptionally high
even during non-recessionary periods); see also A. Roy Thurik et al., Does Self-Emplyment Reduce Unemployment?, 23J. Bus. VENTURING 673, 674 (2008) (discussing whether an increase in
unemployment leads to an increase in startup activity because the opportunity cost of starting
a firm has decreased).
243 See, e.g., Catherine Rampell, Instead of Woi*, Younger Women Head to School N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 28, 2011, at A4 (reporting that young women in school outnumber those in the workforce, and describing the risks associated with resultant student loan debt).
244 See Tamar Lewin, Student Loan Default Rates Rise Sharply in Past Year, N.Y. TIIES, Sept.
13, 2011 (reporting an 8.8% default rate on student loans); Katherine Meyer, Little Cys
Tough It Out, WALL ST. J., Oct. 6, 2011, at B4 (reporting that only forty-seven percent of
businesses launched in 2005 survived at least five years).
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goal. 245 Nonetheless, social mobility has been linked to a stronger mid-

dle class, greater economic opportunity, and political stability.24 6 It has a
moderating impact on society. Employers' use of financial histories reflects only one of many barriers to social mobility, but, even as an incremental barrier, the practice poses significant policy concerns.
D. Addressing Defects in Consumers'Decision-MakingAbilities
Employers frequently scrutinize applicants' financial backgrounds
to learn about these individuals' capacity to be responsible: to complete
tasks and assignments promptly; to defer, when appropriate, to their
superiors; and to play by the rules of a particular organization. 247 In the
process, however, employers are relying on two important assumptions:
(1) that credit reports and financial histories are valid measures of an
individual's capacity to be responsible or conscientious, and (2) that
there is a meaningful relationship between an individual's responsibility levels and his or her capacity to be a responsible employee. The failure of either one of these assumptions casts significant doubt on the
logic of using financial histories in the employment and licensing settings. Elsewhere in this Article, I discuss the empirical relationship be2 48
tween credit reports and key personality traits like conscientiousness.
In this Section, I address to what extent behavioral economics has redefined what it means for a consumer to exhibit "responsibility" or "con2 49
scientiousness" in his or her financial life.

Pursuant to neoclassical economic theory, laws that would bar employers and licensing organizations from considering applicants' credit
reports or financial histories are ill-advised because these prohibitions
conflict with sacrosanct principles of individual autonomy.2 50 Antidis245 E.g., Reihan Salam, Should We CareAbout Relative Mobility, NAT'L REV. ONLINE, (Nov.
29, 2011, 3:50 PM), http://www.nationalreview.com/agenda/284379/should-we-care-aboutrelative-mobility-reihan-salam.
246 See PETER M. BLAU & OTIS DUDLEY DUNCAN, THE AMERICAN OCCUPATIONAL

STRUCTURE 439 (1978) ("The stability of American democracy is undoubtedly related to
the superior chances of upward mobility in this country, its high standard of living, and the
low degree of status deference between social strata."); see also Sabrina Tavernise, MiddleClass Areas Shrink as Income Gap Grows, New Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2011, at A16
(discussing a new study that indicates that the number of American families living in middie-class neighborhoods is declining, suggesting a new "prosperity map" in the United
States with a shrinking middle-class and a "growing concern about inequality").
247 See supra notes 116-136 and accompanying text (discussing the Responsibility Hypothesis).
248 See supra notes 116-136 and accompanying text.
249 See supra notes 250-279 and accompanying text.
250 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAw 3-27 (2011).
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crimination laws, as one commentator has argued, reflect "a dramatic
rejection of classical liberal notions of freedom of contract. 2 51 Individual applicants theoretically have the freedom to limit, through negotiation, employers' access to applicants' financial histories. Indeed, the
FCRA-the federal law that governs creditors' and others' use of credit
reports-codifies this principle. 25 2 Under the FCRA, employers must
secure applicants' permission to access applicants' consumer reports.

253

Because an applicant can safeguard the contents of her credit report by
refusing to sign the employer's authorization form, a blanket prohibition on employers' use of applicants' financial histories is arguably un254
necessary.
If one subscribes to the rule that interference with freedom of
contract should be limited, restrictions on employers' and applicants'
freedom to negotiate the terms of the evaluation process must have
substantial countervailing benefits. I argue that the lessons of behavioral economics, when applied to credit reporting, help justify a prohibition on employers' consideration of applicants' financial histories.
In concluding that a consumer's financial history reveals a certain
level of financial responsibility, employers are relying on several important neoclassical economic assumptions about the contracting process
and consumers' decision-making abilities. A consumer who is deemed
to be "responsible" for a given default is attributed with a considerable
amount of power and autonomy.255 A consumer, for example, is pre-

sumed not to have suffered from material disadvantages in the contracting process. He or she is presumed to have been capable of maximizing his or her own self-interest in deciding whether to enter into a
contract and under what terms.2 56 In the event that a consumer filed
for bankruptcy or defaulted on a particular debt, his or her decision is
251 SeeJohnJ. Donohue, Antidiscrimination Law, in 2 HANDBOOK
ics 1387, 1390 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007).
252

OF LAw AND ECONOM-

15 U.S.C. § 1681-1681t (2006).

25

3 Id. § 1681b(b) (2).
254 But see infra notes 314-315 and accompanying text (explaining that these contracts

are functionally adhesive because employers may be unwilling or unable to deviate from
standardized assessment procedures).
255 See POSNER, supra note 250, at 23-25 (discussing conventional rational choice theory and game theory in evaluating how a rational person will react in various situations).
256 Law and economics scholars presume that individuals exhibit rational choice: they
are "self-interested utility maximizers with stable preferences and the capacity to optimally
accumtlate and assess information." See Jennifer Arlen, Comment: The Future of Behavioral
Economic Analysis of Law, 51 VAND. L. REv. 1765, 1766 (1998). Neoclassical economists acknowledge that certain deviations from the rational choice model occur, but contend that
these deviations are not systematic. See id. at 1767.

HeinOnline -- 53 B.C. L. Rev. 1739 2012

1740

Boston College Law Review

[Vol. 53:1695

presumed to be the result of an opportunistic cost-benefit calculation:
the consumer concluded that repaying the debt would be more costly
than defaulting on it.257
Over the past several decades, behavioral economists have cast serious doubt on the assumptions underlying rational choice theory. Individuals exhibit bounded rationality, bounded willpower, and bounded
self-interest. 258 Behavioral economists have shown, for example, that individuals systematically make poor decisions that are inconsistent with
their preferences. Individuals use incomplete heuristics-or rules of
thumb-that cause them to make bad decisions. 259 Consumers tend to
be overly optimistic about the future. 260 They exercise poor impulse
control. 26 1 Individuals' preferences for and valuations of certain goods
262
and services are affected by how those goods and services are framed.
Scholars have observed the effects of cognitive biases in the housing
market,263 and in credit card transactions. 264 Competitive forces compel
sophisticated sellers to capitalize on these cognitive biases in drafting
contract terms.2 65 The implications of behavioral economists' findings
are stark and disconcerting: individuals systematically and predictably
257 See Block-Lieb &Janger, supra.note 36, at 1493-95 (explaining that, pursuant to the
ex ante incentive analysis of consumer default, "the lure of the discharge proves irresistible
to strategically minded consumer borrowers").
258 HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF MAN: SOCIAL AND RATIONAL 198-99 (1957); Christine Jolls et al., A BehavioralApproach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1471, 1476
(1998); see also Daniel Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for BehavioralEconomics, 93 Am. EcoN. REv. 1449, 1449 (2003) (discussing research that "attempted to obtain a map of bounded rationality, by exploring the systematic biases that separate the
beliefs that people have and the choices they make").
259 SeeJackson, supra note 184, at 1411-12.
260Id. at 1414.
261 Id. at 1408.
262 See Samuel Issacharoff, Can There Be a Behavioral Law and Economics?, 51 VAND. L.

REV. 1729, 1735 (1998); Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 Nw.
U. L. RFv. 1227, 1228-29 (2003) (discussing the "endowment effect," which refers to "the
principle that people tend to value goods more when they own them than when they do
not," and its role in law and economics).
263 In his analysis of subprime mortgages, Professor Oren Bar-Gill has examined why so
many consumers entered into subprime mortgages that were not, in fact, welfaremaximizing, and which frequently resulted in foreclosures. See Oren Bar-Gill, The Law, Economics and Psychology of Subprime Mortgage Contracts, 94 CORNELL L. REv. 1073, 1075 (2009).
Professor Bar-Gill explains that many consumers were harmed by mortgages with a small
monthly payment and a small down payment because many borrowers overestimated both
their ability to afford future high payments and the likelihood that home prices would rise.
Id. at 1079. In addition, because the true cost of a mortgage was difficult to ascertain, consumers may have been unable to adequately gauge their ability to afford the loan. Id.
264See Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic,98 Nw. U. L. REv. 1373, 1375 (2004).
265 Id. at 1373.
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make choices that they themselves-if only they possessed complete informa266
tion-would perceive as wrong.
Behavioral economists' conclusions have called into question rational choice theorists' principle of nonintervention. If consumers are
unable to maximize their welfare in the contracting process, it may be
appropriate for regulators to intervene. Some have suggested how regulators can improve financial disclosures to better enable consumers to
overcome myopia and the optimism bias. 267 Regulators can also restruc-

ture default rules-ones that consumers tend not to change-and other laws to better reflect consumers' subjective preferences. 268 Preserving
consumers' access to a bankruptcy discharge, for example, may compensate for consumers' frequent inability to make decisions that "accurately reflect their own subjective preferences for consumption versus
269
savings."
The conclusions of behavioral economists yield a related conclusion in the context of employers' and licensing organizations' consideration of applicants' financial histories. Employers' and licensing organizations' consideration of credit reports in the employment context
are an implicit attempt to punish and deter certain conduct (to encourage debt repayment) or to allocate a crucial social good-a jobbased upon the wisdom of consumers' financial decisions. To the extent that consumers' choices are fueled less by a scientific, cost-benefit
analysis, and more by imperfect decision-making shortcuts, use of financial histories in the employment setting may miss the mark. Given
ambiguities about the merits of enforcing particular consumer contracts that are the products of systematic cognitive errors, it is arguably
unjust to allow an employer-an uneducated third party-to make
consequential inferences about a debtor based upon his or her record
of bankruptcies and defaults. Default is less probative of an applicant's
level of "financial responsibility" than traditional models suggest.
Thus, just as legal scholars have suggested that the legal rules and
sanctions governing debt default must be reconsidered to account for
weaknesses in the neoclassical model, the nonlegal sanctions of debt de26 6

Jackson, supra note 184, at 1414 n.65.
supra note 263, at 1086 (recommending that regulators require lenders to
incorporate the prepayment option in required disclosures of the annual percentage rate).
268 See Ian Ayres, Menus Matte, 73 U. CHI. L. Rrv. 3, 4 (2006) ("[T]he default rule rev267 Bar-Gill,

olution in part has been an attempt to show lawmakers that they can move the world without restricting contractual freedom. Merely by changing the default, lawmakers-courts
and legislators-can affect the equilibrium.").
269Jackson, supra note 184, at 1412.

HeinOnline -- 53 B.C. L. Rev. 1741 2012

1742

Boston College Law Review

[Vol. 53:1695

fault-including employers' ability to refuse to hire applicants with adverse financial backgrounds-must likewise be reevaluated. Behavioral
economists' findings suggest that it may be appropriate for states and
municipalities to impose limits on this practice, even though doing so
reduces consumers' power to decide for themselves-through contracting-whether or not to grant employers or licensing organizations access to their financial histories.
Employers may argue that imposing a mandatory financial antidiscrimination rule may be overbroad, since employers themselves may be
able to distinguish between applicants on the basis of those factors that
contributed to applicants' financial adversity. Presumably, employers
have no interest in penalizing applicants whose financial transgressions
270
are attributable to cognitive defects unrelated to job performance.
Indeed, employers who scrutinize applicants' credit reports contend
that they often provide applicants with an opportunity to "explain"
those factors that triggered their bankruptcies or financial lapses.

271

Employers claim not to penalize applicants whose financial problems
were triggered by a divorce, ajob loss, a health problem, or some other
unavoidable life problem.

272

In the aftermath of the subprime mortgage

crisis in which millions of Americans lost their homes, 273 employers also
claim to discount foreclosures. 274 Foreclosures may have been destigmatized because they have struck consumers frequently and seemingly capriciously. Alternatively or additionally, the extent of a consumer's responsibility for a given foreclosure may be too difficult to assess, since the recent foreclosure crisis implicated numerous groups,

270 See supra notes 263-266 and accompanying text. Alternatively, however, employers
may presume that individuals who suffer from cognitive limitations in their personal lives
may make poorer decisions in the workplace. Thus, if employers were capable of distinguishing between applicants who suffer from cognitive impairments and those who do not,
employers' preference might be to favor the latter group.
271Background Checking, supra note 60, at 9 (reporting that 87% of employers claim
to give job applicants, in certain circumstances, an opportunity to explain certain adverse
information in their consumer reports, 65% of employers claim to provide this opportunity during the pre-offer period, and 22% claim to provide it during the post-offer period).
272 See EEOC, Oct. 20 Meeting Tr., supranote 165, at 32 (Devata).
273 See Press Release, CoreLogic Reports Almost 65,000 Completed Foreclosures Nation-

ally in February, CoreLogic (Mar. 29, 2012), http://www.corelogic.com/about-us/news/
corelogic-reports-almost-65,000-completed-foreclosures-nationally-in-february.aspx (reporting
nearly 3.4 million completed foreclosures from the start of the financial crisis in September
2008).
274 See Background Checking, supra note 60, at 7 (reporting that only eleven percent of
employers surveyed said that a job applicant's foreclosure status would likely impact their
hiring decision).
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including government regulators, securitization participants, mortgage
275
servicers, and consumers.
Providing applicants with an opportunity to explain the causes of
defaults and bankruptcies, however, cannot sufficiently address the
problems raised by behavioral economists. Several of the factors that
employers claim to discount-a divorce, a job loss, or a health problem-are intervening life events that are commonly understood to affect many individuals somewhat indiscriminately. 276 These do not, in
and of themselves, reflect cognitive biases. Indeed, it is likely very difficult or impossible for employers to deduce which consumer contracts
are the products of cognitive irrationality and which are not. Applicants
themselves may be unconscious of these biases or the role they played
in the applicant's default. 277 Thus, a prohibition on employers' consid-

eration of financial histories is justified, since it is likely too difficult or
too costly to distinguish effectively between those consumers whose financial problems resulted from cognitive biases and those whose financial problems truly might signify more acute, "rational" financial irresponsibility.
Many might argue that the findings of behavioral economists cannot justify a wholesale ban on employers' and licensing organizations'
consideration of financial histories. The prescriptive and normative
implications of behavioral economics remain tentative because behavioral economists do not yet have a "coherent, robust, tractable model of
human behavior," making it difficult to make policy recommendations
based on these findings.

278

Likewise, cognitive biases are reduced as

individuals learn by experience, work within organizations, or obtain
advice from experts.

279

Observations about the systematic and predict-

able defects in consumers' decision-making abilities, however, coupled
with concerns about social mobility and racial equality, suggest, at the
very least, that the decades-old presumption that financial histories are
useful and helpful sources of information about an employee's merits
should be more rigorously challenged.
275 MARK JICKLING, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40173, CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
5-10 (2010) (identifying, among other factors, imprudent mortgage lending, risky finan-

cial activities, securitization, and deregulation as possible causes of the financial crisis).
276 See SULLIVAN ET AL., Supra note 112, at 2 (explaining that bankruptcies are, in large
part, caused by job volatility, separations and divorces, and medical problems).
277 See Claire B. Steinberger, Persistence and Change in the Life of the Law: Can Therapeutic
Jurisprudence Make a Difference?, 27 LAW & PSYCHOL. REv. 55, 57 (2003) ("Cognitive limitation and distortion operate at primarily unconscious and latent levels.").
278Arlen, supra note 256, at 1768.
279

Id. at 1769.
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III.

WHY AN ANTIDISCRIMINATION

NORM Is

[Vol. 53:1695
NECESSARY AND

PREFERABLE TO ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS

This Part explains why a significant expansion in financial history
antidiscrimination laws is both necessary and preferable to alternative
solutions. 280 It first describes how the FCRA and the Bankruptcy Code's
antidiscrimination provisions provide inadequate protection to applicants.

281

It then explains the limitations of an alternative solution: codi-

fying employers' current practice of allowing some applicants to explain what mitigating factors contributed to problems with their credit
history.28 2 Next, this Part describes how a new antidiscrimination norm
can protect employers from the consequences of false stereotypes and
the threat of some negligent hiring suits. 283 Finally, this Part concludes
by explaining that, although antidiscriminatory sentiments have gained
traction during the Great Recession, genuine reform efforts must be
2 84
unconstrained by majoritarian pressures and timing.

A. Why CurrentLegal ProtectionsAre Inadequate
1. The Fair Credit Reporting Act Emphasizes Access and Accuracy, Not
Relevancy
How did consumers' financial history become a widely utilized tool
in the employment process? In large part, a 1970 statute designed to
increase accuracy and privacy in the credit reporting industry-the Fair
Credit Reporting Act (FCRA)285-is responsible for legitimizing em28 6
ployers' use of financial histories.
In passing the FCRA, Congress sought to correct key defects in the
procedures by which the previously unregulated credit reporting indus-

280
281
282
283
284
285

See infra notes 281-418 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 285-402 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 403-410 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 411-413 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 414-418 and accompanying text.
Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1128 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t

(2006)).
286 15 U.S.C. § 1681(b) (stating that the purpose of the FCRA is to "require that consumer reporting agencies adopt reasonable procedures for meeting the needs of commerce for consumer credit, personnel, insurance, and other information in a manner
which is fair and equitable to the consumer, with regard to the confidentiality, accuracy,
relevancy, and proper utilization of such information").
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try operated. The industry was secretive and enigmatic. 287 Consumers
did not know when and by whom their credit reports were being utilized. 288 Consumers had no access to their consumer reports.

289

In addi-

tion, they could not correct incomplete, irrelevant, or obsolete information. 290 Simultaneously, however, consumer reports were often issued to
outsiders for "dubious purposes." 291 Congressional witnesses cited reports of individuals accessing consumer reports to evaluate prospective
husbands and sons-in-law. 292 Indeed, some consumer reporting agencies
would, for an additional fee, also perform private investigative work for
customers. 293 When employers used an applicant's consumer report in
deciding not to hire the applicant, the employer was prohibited by its
contract with the consumer reporting agency from disclosing to the applicant that the consumer report played any role in the decision. 294 As a
result, job applicants had no idea that adverse and frequently erroneous
or subjective information in their consumer reports might be "controlling [their] troubled careers." 295 Even if job applicants discovered that
consumer reporting agencies were disseminating inaccurate information, they had virtually no legal recourse. Because consumer reporting
agencies were largely insulated from defamation claims, 296 agencies en287 See Hearings, FairCredit Reporting, supra note 31, at 33 (statement of Paul Rand Dixon, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission) (discussing how few individuals know where a
major credit reporting agency is physically located).
288See id. at 92 (statement of Alan F. Westin, Prof. of Public Law and Government, Columbia University) (describing privacy breaches by consumer reporting agencies and the
"great ease" with which non-creditors can access consumers' reports).
289 See id. at 66 (statement of Lewis B. Stone, Assistant Counsel to Governor Rockefeller, State of New York) ("Under the present law if you did go to a credit bureau and told
them something awful about me, there would be no way I could find out, subpoena the
records or know anything about it.").
290See id. at 33 (statement of Paul Rand Dixon) (explaining the lack of effective remedies for inaccuracies in consumer reports).
291 See id. at 67 (statement of William E Willier, Director, National Consumer Law Center, Boston College).
292 See id. at 92 (statement of Alan E Westin).
293 See Hearings,Fair Credit Reporting, supra note 31, at 56 (statement of John D. Caem-

merer, State Sen., State of New York) (describing contents of credit reporting agencies'
advertising brochures).
194 See id. at 88 (statement of Alan F. Westin) ("The basic contract between the investigator and the employer states that information from the reports and the identity of the
investigative agency may not be revealed to the person reported on.").
295 See id. at 88-89.
296 The common law provided (and continues to provide) little protection to consumers who suffered damages from inaccurate credit reports, because credit bureaus have a
"qualified privilege to disseminate inaccurate and even defamatory information so long as
they act without malice." See PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 52, § 2:2. Today, common
law actions have largely been superseded by the FCRA's less demanding negligence stan-
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joyed "virtual immunity from judicial accountability." 297 According to
one witness, a "veil of secrecy" surrounded these agencies; many perceived the credit reporting industry to hold the "power of life and
2 98
death" over consumers and their financial futures.
The defects in the procedures by which the industry operated are
precisely those described by Professor Dan Solove in his examination of
the "database problem": the privacy problems triggered by the collec299
tion and use of information by computer databases and the Internet.
Professor Solove argues that, in conceptualizing the issue, commentators can compare the database problem to Franz Kafka's depiction of
"bureaucracy" in The Trial.300 Like the protagonist in The Trial, consumers confronting consumer reporting agencies faced "bureaucratic indifference, arbitrary errors, and dehumanization."30 1 The legislative history of the FCRA reveals that credit reporting agencies created an
atmosphere in which "people fe [lIt] powerless and vulnerable, without
any meaningful form of participation in the collection and use of their
information. "302
Indeed, Congress seized on the metaphor of a broken trial in
framing the essential problems plaguing the credit reporting industry.
30 3 comSenator William Proxmire, a leading sponsor of the FCRA,
plained that "the consumer is confronted with an organized conspiracy
of silence when he attempts to learn the contents of his credit report."30 4 Senator Proxmire argued that in a fair society, "standards of

justice require that the individual be confronted with the charges raised
against him and be given full opportunity to refute them."30 5 Thus, in
crafting credit reporting industry regulations, Congress's primary objective was to give consumers a meaningful participatory role in an otherwise ex parte "trial" that had the potential to deprive a consumer of
credit, insurance, and employment.
dard. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) (2006) (requiring consumer reporting agencies to maintain
"reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy" of the information in consumer reports).
297 See Hearings,Fair Credit Reporting, supra note 31, at 87 (statement of Alan F. Westin).
298 See id. at 19 (statement of Virginia H. Knauer, Special Assistant to the President for
Consumer Affairs).
2" Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphorsfor Information
Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REv. 1393, 1394-95 (2001).
300 Id. at 1398; see FRANz KAFKA, THE TRIAL (Schocken Books 1998) (1925).
301 Solove, supra note 299, at 1398.
302 See
303Wu

id.
& DE

ARmOND,

supra note 25, § 1.4.3.

304 See Hearings,FairCredit Reporting, supra note

31, at 2 (statement of Sen. Proxmire).

305Id.
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The obligations that the FCRA imposes on employers are consistent with this metaphor and message. The FCRA imposes responsibilities on employers at three major stages of the evaluation process. First,
before pulling an applicant's credit report, an employer must clearly
disclose that it may obtain a report for employment purposes. 3 6 Additionally, the employer must obtain the applicant's consent to access the
report.3 0 7 Second, if an employer intends to deny employment to the
applicant based in whole or in part on information in a credit report,
the employer must first provide the applicant with a pre-adverse action
disclosure that includes a copy of the credit report.3 0 8 Third, if the employer ultimately decides not to hire the applicant based on information in her credit report, the employer must provide the applicant with
an adverse action notice (1) informing the applicant that such action
was taken based in whole or in part on information in the consumer
report, (2) listing the contact information of the credit reporting
agency that supplied the report to the employer, and (3) describing the
consumer's right to dispute the accuracy or completeness of any information in the report and his or her right to receive a free credit report
from the credit reporting agency. 30 9 In imposing these requirements,

Congress envisioned that job applicants, armed with employers' disclosures, could monitor the contents of their credit reports and, when
necessary, correct any errors or explain any adverse credit information
310
that might otherwise impact applicants' job eligibility.
Requiring employers to secure applicants' permission before accessing applicants' credit reports seemingly gives individuals control
over the information in their credit reports. 3 11 Prospective employees
and licensees ostensibly hold a key to the database containing their
personal information-a key that they may withhold for any reason.
This is consistent with a normative principle embedded within Samuel
Warren and Louis Brandeis's traditional conceptions of privacy: that an

30615 U.S.C. § 1681b(b) (2) (A) (i) (2006).
307 Id.

§ 1681b(b) (2) (A) (ii).
Id. § 1681b(b) (3). The FCRA defines an "adverse action" in the employment context as "a denial of employment or any other decision for employment purposes that adversely affects any current or prospective employee." Id. § 1681a(k) (1) (B) (ii).
3- Id. § 1681b(b) (3) (B) (i) (I)-(IV).
310 See id. § 1681b(b).
311 See id. § 1681b(b) (2) (A) (ii).
308
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individual should have the right to control the release of information
12
about his or her person.
The requirement that employers secure applicants' permission is
intended to alert job applicants that credit histories may be used in
connection with the hiring process and give them an opportunity to
opt out of the process. 313 In reality, however, job applicants likely have
little real choice in the matter.314 An applicant who refuses to submit to
a financial history screening likely effectively removes him or herself
from consideration for the position, because the employer may be un3 15
able or unwilling to deviate from its standardized vetting process.
The contract is functionally adhesive. An individual's choice is to "take
or leave" the employer's terms-and, thus, her chance at ajob.
Congress's use of a "broken trial" metaphor to describe the problems plaguing consumers was not incorrect, but it presupposed that the
decisionmaker-an employer-is justified in using a consumer's credit
report in rendering a meaningful decision about a consumer. In other
words, the FCRA glosses over the fundamental and threshold question
of whether employers' consideration of applicants' financial histories is
itself appropriate.
In the FCRA, Congress did address some important questions of
relevancy. For example, it limited creditors' and employers' access to
old-or "obsolete" -information in credit reports. 316 Credit reporting
agencies may not report most adverse information more than seven
years old.317 Witnesses also objected to the very sensitive and personal

information contained insome reports, triggering some reform within
the industry.3 18 At the time the FCRA was passed, however, the industry
was already quite large, and Congress recognized that credit reporting
312 Danielle Keats Citron, MainstreamingPrivacy Torts, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1805, 1832
(2010); see Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193, 198-99 (1890).
313 See EEOC, Oct. 20 Meeting Record, supra note 14 (statement of Maneesha Mithal)
(explaining that the FCRA's notification requirement "serves an important role by alerting
job applicants and employees to the fact that the employer may consider consumer report
information in connection with the consumer's application or employment").
314 Desmond, supra note 17, at 909 ("IJ]ob seekers and employees have little real
choice about whether or not to allow employers to obtain credit reports.").
315 With as many as sixty percent of employers utilizing credit reports in the hiring
process, applicants have little leverage in influencing employers' screening methods. See
Background Checking, supra note 60, at 3, 9.
316 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a) (2006).
317 Id. Bankruptcies, however, may be reported for as long as ten years. Id. § 1681c(a) (1);
Wu & DE ARMOND, supranote 25, § 5.2.1.
318See Hearings,Fair Credit Reporting, supra note 31, at 75 (statement of Alan F. Westin)
(describing the "overly intrusive" information contained in consumer reports).
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was indispensable to the fair allocation and pricing of credit.319 In apparent deference to the industry's critical economic role, Congress left
intact the default credit and non-credit uses of credit reports, addressing only the procedures governing the industry.320
The legislative history does not suggest that Congress specifically
endorsed the view that financial histories were necessarily relevant to
employers' scrutiny of employees. By designating employers and licensing organizations as permissible users of credit reports, 321 Congress appears to have intended to subject insurance companies and employers
to government oversight. 322 Its desire was to limit abuses by the credit
reporting industry and to ensure that basic privacy controls were observed.3 23 In deferring to the default uses of credit reporting agencies
and failing to question the wisdom of employers' use of financial information, however, Congress implicitly sanctioned and legitimized
employers' use of financial histories.
Because the statute's protections emphasize consumer access and
neglect questions of the relevancy of the information provided to employers, employers regularly consider bankruptcies and debt histories in
assessing job candidates' relative merits. 324 An antidiscrimination ruleone that makes a prima facie assessment of the relevancy of this information-is thus a necessary supplement to the gaps within the FCRA.
2. The Bankruptcy Code Inadequately Protects Filers from Extralegal
Sanctions for Debt Default
a. Courts'NarrowInterpretationsof the Bankruptcy Code's Antidiscrimination
ProvisionsDilute the Fresh Start
In the American legal system, consumers with excessive debts can
seek a financial "fresh start" by filing for bankruptcy. The Bankruptcy
Code establishes a collective forum in which all of a consumer's debtssecured and unsecured-are categorized and satisfied either through a
319See id. at 13 (statement of Virginia H. Knauer) (describing the vast size of the credit
reporting industry).
320See 15 U.S.C. § 1681b.
321Id. § 1681a(d) (1) (c) (incorporating § 1681b(a) (3) (B)).
322See Hearings,Fair Credit Reporting, supra note 31, at 65 (statement of Sen. Proxmire)
(explaining that legislators included in the definition of "credit rating" a reference to
"character and general reputation" to enable Congress to regulate insurers and employers,
entities that committed "a large proportion of ... abuses").
323See id.

324See supra notes 55-99 and accompanying text.
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sale of all of the debtor's non-exempt 325 assets (i.e., a Chapter 7 liquidation) 326 or through the creation of a plan under which the debtor
agrees to pay creditors' claims from future income over a three-year or
five-year period (i.e., a Chapter 13 rehabilitation).327 To preserve debtors' right to file for bankruptcy and to ensure debtors' unimpeded access to the "fresh start" that it promises, two sections of the Bankruptcy
Code-525(a) and 525(b)-provide limited antidiscrimination protection to bankruptcy filers in the employment context.328 Although bankruptcy is an institutionalized form of debt-forgiveness available to every
debtor, its "fresh start" is noticeably circumscribed because courts have
interpreted these antidiscrimination provisions very narrowly. 329 Con-

sequently, most employers can refuse to hire those who have sought
bankruptcy relief.33 0 Courts' narrow interpretations of the Bankruptcy
Code's antidiscrimination provisions represent a key weakness in current financial history antidiscrimination policies.
Section 525(a) codifies 33 1 Perez v. Campbell, the 1971 Supreme
Court case that invalidated, under the Supremacy Clause, a provision of
an Arizona state law requiring state officials to suspend the drivers' licenses of motorists who failed to satisfy judgments resulting from car
accidents. 33 2 The Court concluded that this state law, which expressly
provided that the tortfeasor's obligations were unaffected by a bank33 3
ruptcy filing, interfered with a debtor's right to a fresh start.

325 Chapter 7 debtors may retain certain property that they already owned at the time

they filed for bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) (2006) (listing as partially exempt the debtor's residence, one motor vehicle, and tools of the debtor's trade (among other items)).
326 CHARLES JORDAN TABB, THE LAw OF BANKRUPTCY § 1.23, at 92 (2009).
327 Id. § 1.25, at 105.
328 11 U.S.C. § 525(a)-(b). A third provision prohibits discrimination against debtorborrowers on the basis of discharged, unrepaid loans by governmental units operating a
student loan or grant program. Id. § 525(c).
329 Although debtors need not be insolvent to file for bankruptcy, Congress in 2005
enacted the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, which instituted
a "means test" that excludes from Chapter 7 those consumers deemed to have sufficient
projected future repayment capacity. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 22, 119 Stat. 23, 29 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C.
707(b) (2006)); see TABB, supra note 326, § 2.15, at 180. These consumers may instead file
for Chapter 13 bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (1).
330 See infra notes 331-347 and accompanying text.
331 S. REP. No. 95-989, at 81 (1978).
332 402 U.S. 637, 656 (1971); see 11 U.S.C. § 525. The Constitution gives Congress the
power "[t]o establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject
of Bankruptcies throughout the United States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
333 See Perez, 402 U.S. at 649.
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In the legislative history of § 525 (a), lawmakers indicated that
courts should interpret the antidiscrimination provisions expansively,
describing the new legislation as a mere first step in protecting individuals' right to file for bankruptcy and to seek a fresh financial start:
[This] section is not exhaustive. The enumeration of various
forms of discrimination against former bankrupts is not intended to permit other forms of discrimination. The courts
have been developing the Perez rule. This section permits further development to prohibit actions by governmental or quasi-governmental organizations that perform licensing functions, such as a State bar association or a medical society, or by
other organizations that can seriously affect the debtors' livelihood or fresh start, such as exclusion from a union on the basis of discharge of a debt to the union's credit union.... The

courts will continue to mark the contours of the antidiscrimi334
nation provision in pursuit of sound bankruptcy policy.

In spite of this invitation to courts to interpret the antidiscrimination
provisions broadly, courts have been reluctant to do so.3 35 Instead,
courts have narrowly interpreted these provisions in three major ways.

336
First, private employers may refuse employment to bankruptcy filers.

Second, any employer-private or public-may discriminate against a
future bankruptcy filer.337 Future bankruptcy filers include those who
may have articulated a good faith intention to pursue bankruptcy relief
but who have not yet formally filed a petition. Third, any employer may
discriminate against a bankruptcy filer, so long as the bankruptcy filing
was not the sole factor in the employer's decision. 33 8 I discuss each limitation in turn.

334 S. REP. No. 95-989, at 81. Section 525(a), prohibiting discrimination against debtors by government entities, was passed six years prior to § 525(b)'s enactment. Because,
however, the provisions of § 525(b) are nearly identical to those of § 525(a), courts have
consulted the legislative history of § 525(a) in assessing Congress's intent in passing
§ 525(b). See, e.g., Leonard v. St. Rose Dominican Hosp. (I' re Majewski), 310 F.3d 653,
658-59 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002).
335 See, e.g., Rea v. Federated Investors, 627 F.3d 937, 941 (3d Cir. 2010); Stinson x:
BB&T Inv. Servs. (in reStinson), 285 B.R. 239, 250 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2002).
336 See infra notes 339-347 and accompanying text.
337 See infra notes 348-371 and accompanying text.
33 See infra notes 372-380 and accompanying text.
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i. Private Employers' Right to Deny Employment to Bankruptcy Filers
Under § 525 (a) of the Bankruptcy Code, a public employer may
not "deny employment to, terminate the employment of, or discriminate with respect to employment against" a current or former debtor
under the Bankruptcy Code.33 9 Section 525(b), in contrast, provides

that a private employer may not "terminate the employment of, or discriminate with respect to employment against" a current or former
340
debtor.
These provisions are noticeably different from one another. Congress included the phrase "deny employment" from the list of actions
that public employers are prohibited from taking, but it omitted the
phrase in the provision governing private employers. Applying the expressio unius est exclusio alterius canon of statutory interpretation, almost
all courts have thus concluded that Congress intended to permit pri3 41
vate-but not public-employers to refuse to hire bankruptcy filers.

Courts have maintained this opinion in cases in which the refusal is
motivated exclusively by the fact that the applicant has sought bank3 42
ruptcy protection.
One court has deviated from this interpretation. In a heavily criticized decision, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York in Leary v. Warnaco, Inc. held that § 525(b) does, in fact, prohibit

339 Section 525 (a) provides in relevant part:

[A] governmental unit may not deny, revoke, suspend, or refuse to renew a license, permit, charter, franchise, or other similar grant to, condition such a
grant to, discriminate with respect to such a grant against, deny employment
to, terminate the employment of, or discriminate with respect to employment
against, a person that is or has been a debtor under this title or a bankrupt or
a debtor under the Bankruptcy Act, or another person with whom such bankrupt or debtor has been associated, solely because such bankrupt or debtor is
or has been a debtor under this tide or a bankrupt or debtor under the
Bankruptcy Act, has been insolvent before the commencement of the case
under this tide, or during the case but before the debtor is granted or denied
a discharge, or has not paid a debt that is dischargeable in the case under this
title or that was discharged under the Bankruptcy Act.
11 U.S.C. § 525(a) (2006).
3
- Id. § 525(b).
341 See Rea, 627 F.3d at 941; Fiorani v. Caci, 192 B.R. 401, 407 (E.D. Va. 1996); Pastore,
186 B.R. at 555.
342 See Rea, 627 F.3d at 941; Fiorani,192 B.R. at 407.
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private employers from refusing to hire current or former debtors. 343
The court implied that Congress's omission of the phrase "deny employment" from § 525(b) was a scrivener's error.344 It concluded that
the phrase "may not ... discriminate with respect to employment"-a

prohibition applicable to both private and public employers- encompasses all aspects of employment, including hiring, firing, and material
changes in job conditions. 345 The court had difficulty reconciling the
stark inconsistency between the two provisions with the rehabilitative
functions of bankruptcy law, concluding that the Bankruptcy Code's
"fresh start" policy mandated that the longer list of prohibited activities
apply to both private and public employers.3 46 The court thus concluded that the plaintiff, whose offer of employment for an executive
assistant position had been rescinded following the employer's review
47
of the plaintiff's credit report, had stated a valid claim.3

ii. Discrimination Against Future Bankruptcy Filers
Section 525 prevents employers from discriminating against an

348
individual who "is or has been a debtor" under the Bankruptcy Code.

In interpreting this provision, some courts have held that both public
and private employers may discriminate against future filers: individuals
who have not yet sought bankruptcy relief.349 Even those individuals
who have expressed a good faith intention to file for bankruptcy re3 50
ceive no protection.
In the only appellate case to address this issue, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in In re Majewski held that an employer
did not violate the Bankruptcy Code's antidiscrimination provisions
343 251 B.R. 656, 658 (S.D.N.Y 2000). Other courts have declined to follow Leary. See,
e.g., In re Stinson, 285 B.R. at 250 ("Section 525(b) prohibits discrimination with respect to
employment, but this prohibition does not include hiring decisions.").
344See Leary, 251 B.R. at 658 ("A Court should not go out of its way to place such an absurd gloss on a remedial statute, simply because the scrivener was more verbose in writing
§ 525(a).").
345Id.
346 Id. ("The evil being legislated against is no different when an employer fires a
debtor simply for seeking refuge in bankruptcy, as contrasted with refusing to hire a person who does so. The 'fresh start' policy is impaired in either case.").
347Id. at 657, 659.
348 11 U.S.C. § 525(b)(1) (2006).
349In re Majewski, 310 F.3d at 656. But see Mayo v. Union Bank (In re Mayo), 322 B.R.
712, 717 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2005) (holding that an adverse action taken against a prospective
bankruptcy filer may be actionable under § 525); Tinker v. Sturgeon State Bank (In re
Tinker), 99 B.R. 957, 960 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1989) (same).
350 See In reMajewski, 310 F3d at 656.
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when it fired an employee after the employee informed the employer
that he intended to file for bankruptcy. 5 1 The court held that, because
the employee had not yet filed for bankruptcy and had never previously
filed (the employee was thus neither a current nor a former debtor
under the Bankruptcy Code), § 525 did not prohibit the employer
352
from terminating the employee.
The Ninth Circuit declined the debtor's invitation to interpret
§ 525 broadly, consistent with courts' interpretations of anti-retaliation
provisions of remedial statutes like Title VII and the Fair Labor Standards Act.3 53 The majority conceded that these anti-retaliation provisions protect employees who express a clear intent to exercise one or
more rights under these statutes.3 54 They do not merely protect those
individuals who have formally asserted their rights by, for example, fil3 55
ing a complaint or instituting a proceeding against an employer.
The majority explained, however, that courts' broad interpretation
of anti-retaliation provisions in these whistle-blower statutes is critical to
their effectiveness, since the government relies on employees to report
employer misconduct. 356 In contrast, a similarly broad interpretation of
the Bankruptcy Code's antidiscrimination provisions is unnecessary to
give full effect to the Bankruptcy Code's policies. 357 Although the court

wanted to encourage debtors to report employers' violations of the antidiscrimination provisions and to protect individuals who had formally
sought bankruptcy protection, the court "[did] not wish to encourage
358
persons to file for bankruptcy or to threaten bankruptcy."
According to the majority, individuals who have filed for bankruptcy are more deserving of protection than those who have not yet
formally filed, since bankruptcy involves a quid pro quo. 359 In exchange
for the protections triggered by a formal bankruptcy filing (including
antidiscrimination protection and a temporary suspension of creditors'
collection efforts through the imposition of the automatic stay360), the
351

Id.

352Id.; see 11 U.S.C. § 525(b) (1).
353In re Majewski, 310 F.3d at 655; see, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006); Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 215 (2006).
354 In re Majewski, 310 F.3d at 655.
355Id.
356Id. at 655.
357 See id. ("While we encourage reporting of statutory violations, we do not wish to encourage persons to file for bankruptcy or to threaten bankruptcy. We wish only to protect
those persons who have invoked the bankruptcy law's protections to obtain a fresh start.").
358 Id.
359See id. at 656.
3- 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).

HeinOnline -- 53 B.C. L. Rev. 1754 2012

Toward a StrongerFinancialHistory AntidisciiminationNorm17

2012]

1755

debtor, according to the majority, turns over assets to the bankruptcy
36
estate and "repay[s] debts that can be paid." '
The dissent described the majority's construction of § 525 as excessively formalistic and inconsistent with Congress's clear intent in the

362
Bankruptcy Code to provide debtors with an unhampered fresh start.

The dissent explained that § 525, which prohibits certain types of dis363
crimination against one "who is or has been a debtor," is ambiguous.
The phrase, as the majority contended, may mean that a debtor must
file for bankruptcy before he or she can be the subject of "discrimination." 364 Under this view, the provision provides no protection to an

employee who is terminated moments before he or she formally files
the bankruptcy petition-an interpretation that, the dissent argued,
sets up an absurd footrace between an employer and a prospective
bankruptcy filer. 65
Alternatively, as the dissent explained, the phrase "who is or has
been a debtor" may be more circumscribed-referring only to a requirement that an individual have attained the status of "debtor" (by
filing a formal bankruptcy petition) before he or she sues a former employer under § 525.366 It is not clear, the dissent claimed, that the individual is protected under the provision only if the employer's discrimi367
nation occurred after he or she formally filed for bankruptcy relief.

The dissent argued that interpreting § 525 to permit an employer
terminate
an employee after the employer has learned of the emto
ployee's intention to file for bankruptcy would create a result inconsistent with the intentions of the Bankruptcy Code's drafters, who passed
§ 525 to ensure that employers could not frustrate the congressional
policy of providing debtors with a fresh start. 368 Courts broadly inter-

pret anti-retaliation provisions of remedial statutes like Title VII not
merely to encourage whistle-blowing, but also to prevent employers
from discouraging employees from exercising individual statutory
rights.

369

According to the dissent, the majority's decision, which pro-

vided no protection to future bankruptcy filers, encouraged the precise

361

lIre Majewski, 310 F.3d at 656; see 11 U.S.C. § 542 (2006).
reMajewski, 310 F.3d at 656-57 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
Id. at 657.

362 h
363
364

Id.

365Id. at

660.

366Id. at

658-59.

367 Id.

at 658-59.
368 In reMajewski, 310 E3d at 658 (citing S. REP. No. 95-989, at 81 (1978)).
369 Id. at 661-62.
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result that the majority sought to avoid.3 70 By providing limited employment protection only to those who have formally filed for bank37
ruptcy, employees have an incentive to "file first and talk later." '
iii. Mixed Motive Cases
Section 525 provides that employers may not discriminate against a
current or former bankruptcy filer "solely because" such an individual
has filed for bankruptcy, has been insolvent before or during the bankruptcy case, or has failed to pay a debt that was discharged or is dischargeable in the case. 372 The vast majority of courts have interpreted

this phrase narrowly, requiring aggrieved claimants to establish that the
prohibited factor was the exclusive reason for the employer's discrimi3 73
natory treatment.
A minority of courts have argued that the same burden of proof
used in Title VII discrimination claims should be applied to Bankruptcy
Code discrimination cases.3 74 According to these courts, it is too burdensome to require employees to prove that no other factors weighed
in the employer's decision to terminate the employee's position.3 75
These courts argue that an employer's discrimination against a bankruptcy filer is unlawful under § 525 if the bankruptcy filing, insolvency,
or failure to pay a dischargeable debt played a "significant role" in the
employer's decision,3 76 or if the employer would not have discriminated
3 77
against the employee "but for" the employee's bankruptcy filing.
370 Id. at

663-64 n.10.

371 Id.
372 11 U.S.C.

§ 525 (2006).
See, e.g., White v. Kentuckiana Livestock Market, Inc., 397 F.3d 420, 426 (6th Cir.
2005); Laracuente v Chase Manhattan Bank, 891 F.2d 17, 23 (1st Cir. 1989).
374 See, e.g., Bell v. Sanford-Corbitt-Bruker, Inc., No. CV186-201, 1987 WL 60286, at *4
(S.D. Ga. Sept. 14, 1987) (applying the burden shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973), to a § 525 claim); Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n v.
Metro Transp. Co. (In re Metro Transp. Co.), 64 B.R. 968, 975 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1986) ("We
further believe that the burden of proof in a discrimination charge under 11 U.S.C.
§ 525 (a) should be approached precisely as in a charge of discrimination in employment,
housing, or public accommodations due to race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.").
375 See Bell, 1987 WL 60286, at *3 ("It would be virtually impossible for a bankrupt to
prove that her employer fired her due only to bankruptcy .... To interpret 'solely' as requiring a bankrupt to prove this scenario would conflict with the policies of the Bankruptcy Act.").
376 See In re Metro Transp. Co., 64 B.R. at 975.
377 See Bel, 1987 WL 60286, at *4; cf Catherine T. Struve, Shifting Burdens: Discrimination
Law Through the Lens ofJury Instructions, 51 B.C. L. REv. 279, 310 (2010) (noting that the
"concept of mixed motives provides an apt description of many instances of discrimination").
373
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One court acknowledged that requiring employees to prove that
no other factors triggered the discrimination makes it more difficult for
bankruptcy filers to seek relief, but argued that an individual's bankrupt status is different from the Title VII and Age Discrimination Act
categories of race, sex, and age.3 7 8 The court stated that "there is not
much one can do about his race, or sex, or age ... but bankruptcy,

while sometimes the result of catastrophic events over which the bankrupt has no control, often results from conduct as to which the bankrupt had a measure of choice." 379 Congress, according to the court,
may have had in mind the mutability of one's financial status in imposing a higher standard of proof to bankruptcy discrimination cases than
380
in Title VII or Age Discrimination Act cases.
b. Bankruptcy as a Critical Component of a FinancialHistory Antidiscrimination Norm

As a result of courts' narrow interpretations of the Bankruptcy
Code's antidiscrimination provisions, it is tremendously difficult for
bankruptcy filers to successfully deter and counter discriminatory
treatment by employers. According to a 2008 study, forty-five percent of
debtors who were denied employment following bankruptcy reported
3 81
that the employer's decision was attributable to the bankruptcy filing.
The stark inconsistency between the Bankruptcy Code's "fresh start"
policy and its limited antidiscrimination protections underscores the
need for legislative action: policymakers must clarify to what extent employers and licensing organizations can consider financial historiesincluding bankruptcy filings-in the employment and licensing process.
The normative factors I consider above provide helpful guidance
about the merits of including bankruptcy within the scope of a stronger
financial history antidiscrimination norm. First, the Fraud Hypothesis-a frequently cited empirical justification for the use of financial
histories in the employment setting 38 2-may be less applicable to bankruptcy filers than to individuals who have accumulated significant debts
but who have not sought bankruptcy relief. Because bankruptcy results
in a substantial decrease in an individual's indebtedness, a bankruptcy
filer might pose a decreased security risk to a given institution. 383 Thus,
378

White, 397 F.3d at 426.

379 Id.
380

See id.

381 Thorne, supra note 17, at 36.
382 See supra notes 101-115 and accompanying text.
383 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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in spite of the tenuous connection between credit scores and an employee's propensity to commit theft,P 4 those who subscribe to the

Fraud Hypothesis may not necessarily oppose the application of an antidiscrimination rule to protect bankruptcy filers.
Second, although some may argue that bankruptcy promotes debt
default, others contend that bankruptcy can increase economic productivity. According to one commentator, the most compelling rationale in support of bankruptcy is the ability of the bankruptcy discharge
to restore the debtor to economic productivity and viable participation
in the open credit economy.385 Consistent with this rationale, there may

be appropriate reasons to limit the discharge (and, consequently, antidiscrimination protection) in some cases. 386 Although bankruptcy may
ultimately increase the cost of credit, one may conceptualize these
added costs as an "insurance premium" necessary to protect all debtors
against the risk of default.

87

Third, behavioral economists' observations about financial decision making suggest that courts' reluctance to construe the Bankruptcy
Code's antidiscrimination provisions as broadly as they interpret other
anti-retaliation provisions may be misplaced. Many courts and employers seem willing to concede that certain "innocent" events like job losses, medical problems, and separations or divorces are deserving of antidiscrimination protection. 388 The implication is that these innocent
events, to the extent that they trigger an adverse financial status, are
more analogous to immutable characteristics (e.g., race, age, and sex)
that have traditionally received antidiscrimination protection. At the
same time, other financial events (e.g., overspending) are perceived as
mutable and products of rational choice. Behavioral economists' findings, however, demonstrate that most individuals predictably and systematically make cognitive errors that can trigger an adverse financial
status. 389 Thus, there may be reason to relax a seemingly tenuous dichotomy between events perceived to be "uncontrollable" and other
adverse financial circumstances, like foreclosures or overspending, that
trigger bankruptcies.
See supra notes 109-112 and accompanying text.
Howard, supra note 180, at 1069.
386 Id. at 1070 (arguing that, consistent with the economic functions of discharge, discharge should be denied to those debtors who, for example, knowingly hindered the
bankruptcy proceedings or engaged in dishonesty).
387 See id. at 1063.
388 See EEOC, Oct. 20 Meeting Tr., supra note 165, at 32 (Devata).
389 See supra notes 247-279 and accompanying text.
384
385
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Fourth, pursuing stronger bankruptcy protections as part of a
broader antidiscrimination reform effort may have a favorable impact
on social mobility. As one commentator has explained, the bankruptcy
discharge suspends or reverses the downward social mobility consumers
encounter in the months or years preceding bankruptcy. 390 Before
bankruptcy, individuals suffer from a decline in wealth from (1) the
compounding of existing debt through fees and interest, and (2) the
loss of assets through foreclosure and repossession. 391 A bankruptcy
discharge alone, however, may be inadequate to prevent bankruptcy
filers from experiencing subsequent financial distress. Scholars have
established that sustained relief requires not only the forgiveness of
past debts through the bankruptcy discharge, but also a stable and sufficient post-bankruptcy income. 92 To the extent that debtors' pursuit
of new jobs and careers is impaired by employers' review of financial
histories, a fortified bankruptcy antidiscrimination rule may reinforce
bankruptcy's promised "fresh start." Although the application of a
stronger antidiscrimination rule will not ensure debtors' access to the
income that some identify as indispensable to post-bankruptcy financial
viability, antidiscrimination can reduce those barriers that may inevitably complicate the search for a newjob or career.
Finally, a comprehensive financial history antidiscrimination norm
requires more than a prohibition on employers' use of credit reportsa medium of information about applicants' financial histories. The
antidiscriminatory goal of such a prohibition could be easily circumvented, since employers may learn about financial events, like bankruptcy filings, through other means, including from public records or
from the existence of a debtor-creditor relationship between the employer and the applicant. 393 Comprehensive protection for debtors thus
requires that employers be prohibited from considering specific financial events-like bankruptcy filings-that they discover from sources
other than credit reports.
Some may argue that antidiscrimination protection should be limited to bankruptcy filers, either for normative or pragmatic reasons.
Bankruptcy is a preexisting, standardized form of debt-forgiveness. It is

Thorne, supra note 17, at 24.
Id.
392 Katherine Porter & Deborah Thorne, The Failureof Bankruptcy's Fresh Start, 92 CORNELL L. REv. 67, 93 (2006).
393 See supra notes 26, 143 and accompanying text.
390
391
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widely available and pursued by millions of Americans every year.394

While the Bankruptcy Code makes key distinctions between different
types of debts in its distribution of limited assets to creditors, 395 all debtors-whether seemingly profligate spenders or the victims of downsizing-can seek refuge under the Bankruptcy Code.

96

Likewise, bank-

ruptcy's collection functions and the repayment obligations it imposes
on debtors in exchange for a discharge of debts397-part of an economic quid pro quo-may make a fortified bankruptcy antidiscrimination rule more palatable to those who might otherwise tolerate discrimination by employers or licensing organizations to deter debt
default. In addition, mandating that employers not discriminate against
bankruptcy filers reorients the conversation from the more divisive topic
of employers' freedom to treat a debt-defaulter differently to a more
philosophical debate about the importance of ensuring, pursuant to the
Supremacy Clause, an individual's full and unimpaired access to a dis398
charge of debt and a fresh start.

While an effective financial history antidiscrimination norm must
fully shield bankruptcy filers from employers' extra-legal sanctions for
debt default, comprehensive reform requires also that non-filers receive
full antidiscrimination protection. Bankruptcy is standardized and
broadly available, but, for several reasons, it may be underutilized. First,
bankruptcy is a limited right. The Bankruptcy Code imposes various
restrictions on a debtor's right to discharge commonly held debts like
student loans and home mortgage loans, limitations that can impact a
debtor's decision about whether to file for bankruptcy. 399 Likewise,
bankruptcy is very much a tool of middle class debtors, as many consumers cannot afford to file. 400 Some debtors who do not file for bank394 SeeJohn Hartgen, Total Bankruptcy Filings Decrease 12 Percent in 2011, Commercial Filings
Fall 19 Percent, Am. BANKR. INST. (Jan. 4, 2012), http://www.abiworld.org/AM/Template.
cfm?Section=Home&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&CONTENTID=64959.
395 See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1)-(10) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010) (listing the relative priorities of specific creditor claims).
396 In other words, debtors need not be insolvent in order to seek refuge under the
Bankruptcy Code. 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
109.03[2] (Alan N. Resnick et al. eds.,
15th ed. rev. 2009).
397 See, e.g., Howard, supra note 180, at 1049-50 (discussing how bankruptcy operates
as a collective distribution mechanism).
398 Any state law that interferes with or is contrary to federal law (including federal
bankruptcy law) violates the Supremacy Clause. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
399 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (8) (2006) (excepting student loans from discharge, unless the
debtor can demonstrate undue hardship); id. § 1322(b) (2) (prohibiting the strip down of
an unsecured lien on the debtor's principal residence).
400 See Richard M. Hynes, Broke but Not Bankrupt: ConsumerDebt Collection in State Courts,
60 FLA. L. REv. 1, 4-5 (2008) (finding that less than twenty percent of Virginia consumers
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ruptcy instead pursue "informal bankruptcy. ' 40 1 Such debtors may not
have any assets to forfeit to creditors and therefore may not derive any
direct economic benefits from a bankruptcy discharge.40 2 Because, however, these individuals' financial histories reveal various adverse events
(e.g., collection actions or creditor lawsuits), non-filers nonetheless may
require antidiscrimination protection in the employment setting. Consequently, bankruptcy antidiscrimination protection is a necessary-but
not sufficient-component of an effective and comprehensive financial
history antidiscrimination norm.
B. The Limitations of ConsumerEmpowerment

To address some of the problems triggered by the use of financial
histories in the employment process, legislators could enhance the procedural protections available to prospective employees and licensees.
Currently, some employers contend that they sometimes give applicants
an opportunity to "explain" adverse information in their credit reports.

40 3

Instead of adopting a wholesale ban on employers' considera-

tion of financial histories, legislators could require employers who consult candidates' credit reports to give candidates an opportunity to
discuss any problematic items in their financial histories. This discussion
would provide applicants with an opportunity to correct any consequential misperceptions. For example, applicants could identify significant
errors in credit reports, or explain what unavoidable circumstances contributed to a bankruptcy or a collection action. Applicants could also
explain to prospective employers that a lawsuit or collection action is a
result of a legitimate billing dispute rather than an attempted evasion of
financial obligations.
On the one hand, increasing applicants' participation in the assessment process could help to reduce the rote and depersonalized nature of employers' review of credit histories. The reform would seemsued in 2001 filed for bankruptcy by 2006). Professor Richard Hynes explains that these
non-filing debtors tend to be poorer than most bankruptcy filers, suggesting that non-filers
may be too poor to file for bankruptcy. See id. at 6; see also Ronald J. Mann & Katherine
Porter, Saving Up for Bankruptcy, 98 GEO. LJ. 289, 292 (2010) (finding that debtors tend to
file for bankruptcy once they have saved up enough money to pay for bankruptcy attorneys' fees and court costs).
401 See Hynes, supra note 400, at 3.
402 Debtors with no nonexempt or unencumbered assets are called "judgment proof."
William C. Whitford, A Critique of the Consumer Credit Collection System, 1979 Wis. L. REv.
1047, 1055.
403 See supra note 271 and accompanying text (describing the percentage of employers
that claim to provide applicants with such an explanatory opportunity).
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ingly humanize the process by providing applicants with the opportunity
to respond to "charges" leveled against them. 40 4 In addition, an indi-

vidualized inquiry could reduce the unfairness that could otherwise result if an organization presumptively disqualified a candidate based
upon adverse information in his or her credit report. In other words,
allowing applicants to participate in the evaluation process could reduce
the imprecision triggered by a third party's power to make probabilistic
inferences about a given individual based upon that individual's posses40 5
sion of a particular trait.

At the same time, however, increasing applicants' participation in
prospective employers' review of financial histories unfairly places applicants on the defensive. The practice-similar to the FCRA approach
toward employers' use of financial histories-too readily presumes the
existence of a link between an adverse financial history and a prospective employee's merits. 40 6 Institutionalizing candidates' opportunity to
respond to employer concerns could entrench and calcify existing stereotypes about individuals who encounter financial calamity. 40 7 It effec-

tively establishes a rebuttable presumption that errors in applicants'
financial histories constitute bona fide "red flags." As a result, the reform could strengthen the debt-enforcement function of employers'
use of financial histories because it institutionalizes employers' scrutiny
of adverse financial events like bankruptcies or debt defaults.

408

Such a reform is, at best, an incomplete solution. It is likely to be
expensive and administratively onerous. Compliance would be difficult
to monitor. It also presumes that employers would be able to distinguish
effectively between "forgivable" adverse debt problems and more problematic ones.40 9 In addition, requiring employers to ask employees
about adverse financial circumstances might require applicants to disclose information about their marital status or underlying medical con-

404 This could alleviate many of the privacy concerns cited by Professor Solove in his
examination of the "database problem" (the privacy problems caused by the collection of
personal information by computer databases). See Solove supra note 299, at 1394-95; see
supra notes 299-302 and accompanying text.
401 See, e.g., KIRKLAND, supra note 15, at 21.
406 See supra notes 285-324 and accompanying text.
407 Cf Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution Is Color-Blind,"44 STAN. L. Rrv. 1, 2
(1991) (arguing that "color-blind" policies-ones that seek to ignore or sanitize difference-in effect perpetuate racism). Similarly, although mandated employer discussions
about consumer reports might attempt to "correct" for stereotypes, these employer reviews
might instead entrench them.
408 See supra notes 156-190 and accompanying text.
409 EEOC, Oct. 20 Meeting Tr., supra note 165, at 32 (Devata).
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ditions, which may raise other discrimination problems. 410 Applying a
heightened financial antidiscrimination norm to the employment setting is a more blunt reform, but it would represent an informed societal
and legal judgment about the wisdom and ethics of employers' and licensing organizations' consideration of candidates' financial histories.
C. ProtectingEmployers from the Consequences ofFalse Stereotypes
Employers and licensing organizations face tremendous pressure
to consult various sources of information about applicants. Licensing
organizations, for example, may feel compelled to consult candidates'
backgrounds in order to prevent scandals and to limit legislatures from
encroaching on their self-regulatory authority. Employers and employer advocates, in addition, contend that employers must conduct
thorough background checks on applicants in order to forestall negli411
gent hiring claims.
A survey of cases, however, reveals few-if any-successful negligent hiring claims brought against employers for failure to consult
credit reports or some other aspect of an employee's financial history.412 This dearth of cases might suggest that employers are utilizing
this rationale as a pretext. Alternatively or additionally, it may indicate
that credit reporting agencies have successfully capitalized on a combination of (1) widely held preconceptions about those with adverse financial histories, and (2) employers' fear of liability. Indeed, credit reporting agencies regularly market consumer reports as prudent,
413
money-saving risk-mitigation tools.
The negligent hiring rationale demonstrates the extent to which
preconceptions about the relevancy and validity of financial histories
have been embraced by a risk-averse legal and administrative culture.
When a preconception about a group is entrenched, antidiscrimination
laws may be necessary not only to prevent the application of a stereotype against an individual, but also to protect the employer from concerns about liability and loss that are fueled by third parties' embrace
410 For example, the Americans with Disabilities Act prohibits employers from asking
questions during the pre-offer period that are likely to reveal the existence of a disability.
42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2006 & Supp. II 2008); see alsoJob Applicants and the Americans with
Disabilities Act, U.S. EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY COMW'N, http://www.eeoc.gov/facts/
jobapplicant.html (last updated Mar. 21, 2005) (describing the questions that an employer
may not ask in an application or during an interview).
411 See supra notes 145-147 and accompanying text.
412 See supra notes 145-147 and accompanying text.
413See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
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of the stereotype. Employers themselves may need robust financial history antidiscrimination laws to successfully reduce the real or perceived
threat of lawsuits that are grounded in inaccurate narratives about
debtors and debtor behavior.
D. A CautionaryNote: Antidiscrimination'sAnti-MajoritarianDirective
The post-recession recovery period-marked by high unemployment 414-- has highlighted the normative and logical weaknesses of employers' use of candidates' financial histories in the evaluation process.
Foreclosures and job losses have seemingly stricken households somewhat capriciously, and there is a widespread sense that "Main Street"
consumers-relative to the 'Wall Street" elite-have been systematically
disadvantaged. Public officials have responded with various proposals
to help ensure that consumers-particularly the long-term unem4 15
ployed-are not treated differently by employers.
In the current tumultuous political and economic climate, a financial antidiscrimination norm caters to majoritarian and populist sympathies. As a result, proposals to reduce the role of financial history in the
employment process have gained traction. As of the time of this writing,
seven states have passed laws that limit employers' consideration of
416
credit histories.
In the aftermath of the Great Recession-a period of significant
financial upheaval for millions of Americans-proposals advancing a
stronger financial history antidiscrimination norm are more likely to
induce change. At the same time, however, the timing of this movement may, by oversimplifying its message, pose a philosophical dilemma. By promoting an enhanced antidiscrimination norm during a
weak economy, policymakers may be sending a message that the harms
of employers' and licensing organizations' use of financial histories are
most acute and problematic during periods of high unemployment or
widespread economic stress. While this message is not necessarily incorrect, it is incomplete and reductionist.
The harms of financial history discrimination in the employment
or licensing setting may be felt or perceived by the largest number of
414 Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor 1 fig.1 (Oct. 5, 2012),
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/eripsit.pdf (showing unemployment above eight percent from August 2010 to August 2012).
415 President Barack Obama, for example, has proposed to ban employers from discriminating against job applicants because they are unemployed. Robert Pear, Obama Seeks
to Prohibit 'NoJobless Need Apply, 'N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2011, at A14.
416 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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people during a weak economy. In part, this may be because employers
increase their scrutiny of financial histories during a competitive market in which larger numbers of workers vie for a limited number of positions. 417 It would be a mistake, however, for policymakers, employers,
and judges to conclude that the need for antidiscrimination reform is
transitory, or that job candidates' need for greater antidiscrimination
protections will predictably decline as economic conditions improve.
The normative harms of employers' use of financial historiesmost notably, threats to social mobility and to racial equality-are not
unique to weak economies. Minority communities, for instance, take
much longer to emerge from recessions. 418 As a result, applicants' need
for financial history antidiscrimination protection will persist long after
unemployment numbers decline. In addition, the empirical strengths
and weaknesses of the practice-the ability of employers to make valid
statistical deductions about employees' personality traits-are unrelated to underlying economic conditions.
Thus, the timing of the financial history antidiscrimination reform
movement is a double-edged sword. The currently weak economy and
high unemployment numbers cause the issue to resonate with a large
segment of the population, but genuine antidiscrimination reform efforts must be unconstrained by prevailing majoritarian sentiments.
CONCLUSION

Financial histories have an expansive and seemingly indelible impact on individuals' lives, extending far beyond the domain of access to
credit. In recent years, an increasing number of employers and licensing organizations have used credit reports and financial histories in assessing a prospective employee's or licensee's merits. The recent recession has caused many to question the logic and ethics of that practice.
This Article examined the normative justifications of the use of
financial histories in the employment and licensing settings. Although
consideration of financial history may have a moderate economic benefit by deterring debt default, important countervailing factors- including the practice's adverse impact on racial equality and social mobility,
See Desmond, supra note 17, at 907-08.
Alcee L. Hastings, Inequality in Unemployment, CONG. BLACK CAUCUS, http://the
congressional blackcaucus.com/2011/07/25/inequity-in-unemployment/ (last Nisited Oct. 9,
2012) ("Black Americans experience longer stretches of unemployment than the general
population, and minority-owned businesses have been hit particularly hard. The sad fact is
that while our national unemployment rate has dropped to around nine percent, unemployment for black Americans still remains at 16 percent.").
417

418
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and ambiguities about its empirical validity-justify the adoption of a
more robust financial history antidiscrimination norm. Current laws,
including the Fair Credit Reporting Act and state laws limiting employers' use of financial histories, function to entrench prevailing stereotypes about debtor behavior and to legitimize employers' right to access
applicants' financial histories. Likewise, the Bankruptcy Code's antidiscrimination provisions provide only nominal protection to debtors-an
omission that functions to erode the "fresh start" necessary to improve
debtors' financial futures. Research by behavioral economists suggests
that it may be reasonable to analogize consumers' adverse financial statuses to more traditional "immutable" categories (e.g., race, age, and
sex) that receive more robust antidiscrimination protection under existing laws.
An enhanced financial history antidiscrimination norm will require employers and policymakers to question the usefulness of information that for decades has been embraced as relevant and helpful.
Adoption of fortified financial history antidiscrimination protections
can promote racial and economic equality, give employers the freedom
to focus on those qualities that have a demonstrated relationship to job
success, and reduce the impact of dubious preconceptions about job
applicants' adverse financial backgrounds.
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